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  Article 
 
Toward a New Human Rights Paradigm: 
Integrating Hitherto Neglected Traditional 
Values into the Corpus of Human Rights and the 
Legitimacy Question 
 
Dr. Obiajulu Nnamuchi* 
 
The U.N. Human Rights Council recently passed a resolution 
on “traditional values of humankind” as a vehicle for “promoting 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.” It sounds innocuous, but 
its implications are ominous. Indeed, it is an immediate threat to the 
rights of many vulnerable groups – including women and lesbian, 
gay, bi-sexual and transgender (LGBT) people. And it flies in the 
face of the founding principles of universality and indivisibility 
enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
- Graeme Reid 
 
We think that no state or group of states has the right to monopolize 
interpretation of human rights regulations. Attempts to advance one-
dimensional interpretation under the guise of the versatile standard 
perilously tell on people’s attitude to the mere concept of human 
rights making it foreign for entire communities and population 
strata. On the other hand, human rights doctrine will only benefit if 
it absorbs elements of different cultures. 
 –Russia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
  
[T]he protection and promotion of diversity and equality between 
nations and cultures were the prerequisites for genuine harmony in 
the relations between civilizations and within any society of our time. 
The world was interdependent but not homogenous. There was no 
country or civilization where freedoms, human rights and equality 
were not of major importance, but there were different perceptions 
of these issues.  
–Natalia Narochnitskaya, President, Institute for Democracy and 
Cooperation (Paris Office)
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Abstract 
 
The vitriolic nature of the attack unleashed at the on-going debate at 
the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) on integrating 
theretofore neglected traditional values into the corpus of human 
rights hardly elicits surprise. The attack reflects quite strongly the 
age-long divide regarding the appropriate conceptualization of 
human rights – as universal or culture-specific. Deniers of 
universality have long maintained that because certain worldviews 
were not taken into account in formulating and framing foundational 
human rights instruments, to ascribe universality to norms resulting 
from such process is wrong on several fronts. Although this position 
raises a number of important concerns for which unraveling, 
exploration, and resolution are necessary for legitimizing the 
universality of human rights, they have largely been ignored, 
particularly at the international policy- and law-making fora. That 
is, until now.  This latest development (extant UNHRC debate) raises 
a number of questions with significant implications for the future of 
global human rights protection. The most critical of these questions 
–and also the subject of this paper – centers on whether the 
integration of hitherto neglected traditional values would add 
legitimacy to the claim of universality of human rights.  
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Toward a New Human Rights Paradigm: 
Integrating Hitherto Neglected Traditional 
Values into the Corpus of Human Rights and the 
Legitimacy Question 
 
Dr. Obiajulu Nnamuchi 
 
I. Introduction and preliminary background 
 
The controversy currently embroiling the United Nations 
(UN) Human Rights Council (UNHRC or Council) has its origin in a 
document produced at the conclusion of the second UN-sponsored 
global conference on human rights in 1993.1 The very first 
substantive provision of the “Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action” (Vienna Declaration) was a reaffirmation of the commitment 
of participating nations to promote universal respect for and 
observance of all human rights in accordance with the UN Charter 
and other human rights instruments.2 Although in agreement that the 
“universal nature of these rights and freedoms is beyond question,” 
the countries went further to stipulate that “[i]n this framework, 
enhancement of international cooperation in the field of human rights 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
  * LL.B. (Awka), LL.M. (Notre Dame), LL.M. (Toronto), M.A. 
(Louisville), LL.M. (Lund), S.J.D. (Loyola, Chicago), Assistant Professor of Law, 
University of Nigeria; President - and Chief Consultant, Centre for Health, 
Bioethics and Human Rights (CHBHR) Enugu, Nigeria. To my human rights 
brethren whose encouragement sustains the intellectual curiosity as well as AdaObi 
Nnamuchi, my able assistant, I remain eternally grateful. All errors and omissions 
remain my sole responsibility. 
1 World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993,Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24 at 20 (July 12, 
1993).  The first world conference on human rights, known simply as 
the International Conference on Human Rights, was held in Teheran, Iran, in 1968 
as part of the activities to mark the twentieth anniversary of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights The outcome of that conference was the adoption of 
the International Conference on Human Rights, April 22 – May 13, 1968, 
Proclamation of Teheran, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 32/41 at 3 (1968). 
2 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, id. Part 1, ¶1. 
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is essential.”3 This “international cooperation” was sought to be 
achieved by the global community through a subsequent UNHRC 
Resolution on “Promoting Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms through a Better Understanding of Traditional Values of 
Humankind,” adopted as a “Follow-Up to and Implementation of the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action,”4 and which made the 
following request of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights: 
 
[T]o convene, in 2010, a workshop for an exchange 
of views on how a better understanding of traditional 
values of humankind underpinning international 
human rights norms and standards can contribute to 
the promotion and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, with the participation of 
representatives from all interested States, regional 
organizations, national human rights institutions and 
civil society, as well as experts selected with due 
consideration given to the appropriate representation 
of different civilizations and legal systems.5  
 
In compliance with this request, the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights hosted a workshop on traditional values and human 
rights on October 4, 2010.6 The workshop, which was held in 
Geneva, Switzerland, attracted the participation of experts from a 
wide range of cultures, civilizations and legal systems as well as 
country representatives, scholars, and a host of other stakeholders, 
including non-governmental organizations.7 The participants’ charge 
was quite clear, to have a dialogue on “how a better understanding of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Id. 
4 Human Rights Council Res. 12/21, Follow up to and Implementation of 
the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 12th Session, 
A/HRC/RES/12/21 (October 12, 2009) [hereinafter HRC 12/21]. 
5 Id. at ¶ 1. 
6 Human Rights Council Res. 16/37, Workshop on Traditional Values of 
Humankind, Follow-up and implementation of the Vienna Declaration and , 
A/HRC/16/37 (Dec. 13, 2010), available at   
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/16session/A-HRC-16-37.pdf 
[hereinafter HRC 16/37]. 
7 Id. at Summary. 
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traditional values . . .  underpinning international human rights norms 
and standards” in different societies can aid in human rights 
promotion and protection.8 A subsequent UNHRC Resolution 
ratified the holding of the workshop.9 
 In her opening address at the workshop, the South African-
born UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navanethem 
Pillay, was unequivocal about the task at hand, namely, exploring 
“traditional values underpinning human rights”, which she describes 
as not including the entire corpus of traditional values but only those 
“in line with human rights.”10 As for those traditional values that are 
inconsistent with the universal appeal and authority of human rights, 
she urged that they should be jettisoned.11 She was, however, not 
canvassing outright and unreflective rejection of obnoxious and 
repugnant traditional values; instead, her perspective was that the 
decision to reject traditional values should directly result from 
careful deliberation informed by their juxtaposition against those 
values that have been recognized as promotive of human rights. 
“Understanding the common normative underpinnings of both sides 
of that equation” she concludes, “was important for more effective 
human rights promotion, and, ultimately, more humane societies.”12 
 The Executive Director of the United Nations Population 
Fund (UNFPA), Thoraya Ahmed Obaid, a national of Saudi Arabia 
delivered a remarkable keynote address mirroring the views of the 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.13 Her address stresses 
the need for cross-cultural enrichment of human rights through 
genuine interrogation and integration of relevant traditional values, 
whilst weeding out negative ones.14 In her view, the path forward for 
human rights must involve a clear identification, contestation, 
negotiation and eventual reconciliation of cultural values and beliefs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Id. at ¶ 1. 
9 Human Rights Council Res. 16/3, Promoting Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms through a Better Understanding of Traditional Values of 
Humankind, 16th Session, A/HRC/RES/16/3 (April 8, 2011) [hereinafter HRC 
16/3]. 
10HRC 16/37, supra note 6 at ¶ 5. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at ¶ 6. 
14 Id. at ¶ ¶ 7 – 8. 
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from within the affected communities.15 Underlying persistent 
violation of human rights, particularly those that are products of 
cultural beliefs and practices, she forcefully explains, is inattention to 
this precept.16 Achieving reversal thereof, in the sense of stemming 
culture-triggered infringement upon human rights, must involve 
“listening and promoting dialogue within communities”17 and cannot 
be the result of imposition by external forces.18 The workshop, 
involving participants from a wide array of cultures and civilizations, 
many of them struggling with reconciling their traditional values 
with the dictates of international human rights norms, clearly 
instantiates a forum for promoting the kind of community dialogue 
envisioned by the UNFPA Director. 
 In a more assertive tone, a civil society organization leader, 
Natalia Narochnitskaya, seeks to place all cultures on an equal 
pedestal in terms of their potential contribution to human rights 
protection.19 At the root of respect for and observance of human 
rights in all cultures, Western world included, is tradition.20 The 
normative basis of human rights in countries in the West is the 
Greco-Christian concept of natural law, which Narochnitskaya 
projects as representative of a particular traditional value system.21 
Narochnitskaya contends that even the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR)22 and the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, typically referred to as the 
“European Convention on Human Rights” (ECHR)23 were anchored 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Id. at ¶ 6. 
16 Id. at ¶ 7. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at ¶ 8; see also id. at ¶ 25 (recalling the concern of a delegate that 
universality of human rights is subject to constructions placed upon it by different 
peoples and that these different constructions must be taken into consideration to 
prevent the imposition of  “a particular ethnocentric standard on the rest of the 
world . . .”).    
19 Narochnitskaya is the President of the Institute for Democracy and 
Cooperation (Paris Office). See HRC 16/37, supra note 6 at ¶ 9. 
20 Id. at ¶10. 
21 Id. 
22 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/217 (III) (Dec. 10, 1948), at art. 1, 15.  
23 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]. 
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on “values that were deeply rooted in tradition.”24 Anchoring human 
rights to traditional values provides a deeply grounded conviction for 
compliance with resulting legal obligations as opposed to compliance 
generated by fear of penal sanctions. This is a reason Narochnitskaya 
endorses the on-going UNHRC dialogue on the interface between 
human rights and traditional values.25  
The most provocative contribution, by far, came from Joseph 
Prabhu, a philosophy professor from the United States.26 Relying on 
Mahatma Gandhi’s conviction that there are multiple ways 
universality of human rights might be conceived, Prabhu postulates 
that intercultural dialogue on the constitutive elements of human 
rights is essential in order to prevent imposition of one ethnocentric 
standard on the rest of humanity.27 By interrogating all value systems 
on the basis of equal standing and resisting the temptation to 
privilege one over the other, ideas gleaned from one could be used to 
correct, improve, and strengthen the other.28 The kind of model that 
would actualize the desired purpose is one that attempts:  
 
[N]either to transcend cultural differences nor to 
solve them by making one culture superior to others, 
but rather to take the other cultures seriously and 
attempt an open-minded, meaning-and-truth-seeking 
dialogue.29  
 
This means that future development of human rights must be 
engineered away from its “original Western-oriented” roots to 
incorporate other traditions, as each of these traditions “might have 
something to contribute to the development of a global human rights 
culture.”30 China shares this view.31 Its position was unmistakably 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 HRC 16/37, supra note 6 at ¶ 10; see also ¶ 21 (noting a claim by the 
Representative of Cuba that “since every legal system drew on customs and 
traditions, it was essential that traditions and the realities of peoples be taken into 
account” in further development of international law relating to human rights.). 
25 Id. at ¶ 11. 
26 Id. at ¶ 25. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at ¶ 26. 
30 Id. at ¶ 27. 
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clear; and that is, the concept of human rights is not an exclusive 
monopoly of a few countries but is part of the traditional value 
system of every country.32  
 The major Western powers at the workshop – the United 
States and the European Union – veered in a different direction.33 
The United States representative was troubled by the notion of 
“traditional values” as a relevant factor in human rights promotion 
and protection.34 The concept of “traditional values” is alien to 
human rights and could detrimentally impact the observance of the 
universal principles already endorsed by international human rights 
law.35 There is no universally agreed definition of the term 
“traditional values” and this renders the concept so vague and 
imprecise as to be capable of being used to legitimize human rights 
abuses.36 For these reasons, the United States would continue to 
support extant framework and oppose attempts to use allegiance to 
“traditional values” as a subterfuge for violation of human rights 
law.37 Similarly, Belgium (representing the European Union) was 
critical of the notion of “traditional values” due to what it 
characterizes as its negative connotation, susceptibility to broad 
interpretation, and likelihood of undermining the principles 
enshrined in international human rights instruments.38 Only when 
traditional values are enriching of human rights do they deserve 
some consideration, otherwise they should be discarded.39 
 The preceding paragraphs have a specific aim: to demonstrate 
high-level polarity of views regarding the place of cultural or 
traditional values in global human rights discourse. Many of these 
views obviously stand in sharp contrast to one another. One camp 
recognizes that the current incarnation of human rights is 
unapologetically rooted in tradition – that of the West; yet, Western 
representatives (the United States and Europe) had no trouble 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Id. at ¶ 61. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at ¶¶ 42, 60. 
34 Id. at ¶ 42. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at ¶ 60. 
39 Id. 
 
 
 
 
32 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. Vol. XIV 
	  
	  
32	  
	  
castigating and denouncing traditional values as appropriate 
considerations in formulating human rights. To so attack tradition, 
notwithstanding the grounding of extant human rights framework on 
Judeo-Christian tradition of Europe and North America, seems quite 
difficult to decipher. But the attack is inexplicable on the basis of 
ignorance; instead, it reflects something much more disconcerting. 
Historically, perhaps as relics of colonial imperialism, ideas or 
practices rooted in traditional values of non-Western societies have 
always been regarded as suspect –in some cases these traditional 
ideas and practices are considered automatic candidates for 
inquisition. This attitude raises two critical questions. First, is 
international human rights law, as represented in extant international 
human rights instruments, sufficient to respond to the wellbeing of 
all people regardless of their geographical or cultural location? 
Second, are human rights universal in the sense that human rights 
speak to fundamental values shared by all humanity?  
Until recently, the response to both questions has almost 
always been uniformly affirmative. But dissenting voices are 
gradually emerging, challenging this dominant position and 
demanding a rethinking on the subject:  
 
What is at stake . . . is often the very legitimacy of 
human rights talk in the international arena. If human 
rights necessarily rest on a moral or metaphysical 
foundation that is not in any meaningful sense 
universal or publicly defensible in the international 
arena, if human rights are based on exclusively 
Eurocentric ideas, as many critics have . . . claimed, 
and these Eurocentric ideas are biased against non-
Western countries and culture, then the political 
legitimacy of human rights talk, human rights 
covenants, and human rights enforcement is called 
into question.40 
 
Dissenting voices are becoming stronger, urging the integration of 
traditional values that were neglected in the development of human 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Amy Gutmann, Introduction, in MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, HUMAN RIGHTS 
AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY vii, xvii (2001). 
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rights. A Russian Foreign Ministry statement powerfully captures 
this dissent: 
 
[H]uman rights must serve the instrument of 
consolidation . . . the Human Rights Council, acting 
in a cooperative spirit, must use comprehensive 
approaches and focus on searching for certain 
solutions intended to ensure true omnitude of human 
rights. One of such decisions is strengthening 
understanding of interconnection between human 
rights and traditional values of the mankind.41 
 
Remarkably, the division at the Council adopted a familiar path: 
nations that have historically dominated and sculpted the global 
architecture of human rights (Western liberal societies) defend the 
status quo in contradistinction to the position advanced by emerging 
nations (mostly developing countries) whose worldviews had little or 
no influence in the development of human rights. Further evidence of 
this gulf is apparent at the UNHRC in the vote authorizing the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights to convene the “traditional 
values” workshop mentioned previously.42 Virtually all the 
participating developing countries, including Russia and China, 
voted in favor of the workshop; whereas most Western nations, 
including the United States, United Kingdom, France and Belgium, 
were in opposition.43 The bitter divide is captured in the final tally of 
the vote: 26 countries voted in support of convening the workshop44 
whereas 21 either voted against convening the workshop or abstained 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Press 
Release About the UN Human Rights Council Adopting Russian Resolution Draft 
“Encouraging Human Rights and Main Human Freedoms through Deeper 
Understanding of Traditional Mankind Values: Best Practice” (Sept. 27, 2012), 
available at  
http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/newsline0/735D5EA855B1525944257A8A0028F44. 
42  HRC 16/37, supra note 6. 
43 HRC 12/21, supra note 4.  
44 The countries include Angola, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Burkina 
Faso, Cameroon, China, Cuba, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, India, Indonesia, Jordan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Russian 
Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Africa, and Zambia; Id. 
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from voting.45 This voting pattern was repeated in a subsequent 
Resolution adopted in welcoming the report of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, which contained the summary of 
the workshop’s deliberations.46  
 This paper consists of five sections. Following this 
introduction, Part I demonstrates the conceptual amorphousness and 
fluidity of human rights. Part I’s major thesis is that many of the 
rights currently recognized as fundamental were previously subjects 
of very intense controversy. The section argues that human rights are 
still evolving and, as such, there is nothing odd about integrating 
traditional values into human rights as part of the evolutionary 
process. Part II pursues this theme further by questioning universalist 
and relativist doctrines of human rights. It projects homosexuality as 
demonstrative of the fundamental and irreconcilable chasm between 
moral universalism and relativism, and shows how this impacts 
universality credentials of extant human rights regime. Part III 
demonstrates the futility of forcing compliance with the dictates of 
legal regimes that stray from the traditional values of the target 
population. This section relies on female circumcision or female 
genital ritual (FGR) in proof of this point. The conclusion –Part IV – 
is that despite the best efforts of the UNHRC and its Advisory 
Committee, the universality foundation of the current human rights 
regime remains a legitimate moral and legal question.  
 
II. Conceptual challenges 
 
The maxim “one man’s meat is another man’s poison” is 
starkly illustrated by the event of July 4, 1776.47 Although the 
American Declaration of Independence is historically revered as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 The opposing nations consist of Belgium, Chile, France, Hungary, Italy, 
Japan, Mauritius, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Republic of Korea, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and United 
States of America, while Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Ghana, 
Ukraine, and Uruguay abstained. Id. 
46 HRC 16/3, supra note 9. 
47 For the full text of the Declaration of Independence, see The 
Declaration of Independence: A Transcription, available at  
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/declaration_transcript.html (last visited 
Jan. 28, 2013). 
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milestone in the development of human rights, at the time the 
Continental Congress (comprising the original thirteen colonies that 
formed the United States of America) adopted the Declaration, there 
was no global unanimity as to the legitimacy of the human rights 
claimed by the founding fathers. The thirteen colonies, already at war 
with Great Britain for over a year, used the Declaration to justify 
their rejection of British imperial authority in preference to self-
governance: 
  
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men 
are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among 
these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.–
That to secure these rights, Governments are 
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers 
from the consent of the governed, –That whenever 
any Form of Government becomes destructive of 
these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to 
abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying 
its foundation on such principles and organizing its 
powers in such form, as to them shall seem most 
likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. 48 
 
At issue was the power (or legitimacy thereof) of the British 
Parliament to legislate, particularly on tax matters, for territories, 
such as the United States, that had their own legislatures. Did 
Thomas Jefferson and the rest of the founding fathers or, indeed, the 
citizenry possess the power they claimed for themselves, namely: 
“That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of 
these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it”? Yes, 
historians record that on that historic day, as the Declaration was 
being read, church bells were ringing throughout the territories, 
echoing the people’s unanimous ratification of the solemn 
proclamation. But not everyone shared this sentiment. King George 
III and Prime Minister Lord North, in particular, had other ideas. In 
their view, and this represented the mainstream thinking in Great 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Id. 
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Britain at the time, Parliament was supreme throughout the British 
empire, its legislation was constitutional and not subject to challenge 
by any of the colonies. There was no right to unilateral declaration of 
independence inhering in colonial territories.  
Nonetheless, even at that time, this right – to self-
determination or independence (as claimed by the founding fathers) 
– was a core human right, as subsequently proved by its codification 
nearly two hundred years later in the International Bill of Rights –the 
UDHR,49 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR),50 and International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR).51 And yet during the American 
Revolutionary War of the latter half of eighteenth century (1775–
1783), this critical foundational human right was violently 
denounced by Great Britain. 
 This anecdote is an illustration of the divergent and often 
conflicting understandings and constructions that have always 
characterized human rights. Employing the United States and the 
United Kingdom for this purpose, perhaps the two closest allies in 
contemporary times, was not inadvertent; instead, the idea was to 
point out that although since the end of World War both countries 
have almost always stood together on the issue of human rights, at 
one time, they had a fundamental disagreement as to the meaning of 
what is now considered a basic tenet of human rights. Eighteenth 
Century United States was mostly populated by people whose 
ancestry is European (largely Great Britain); yet, despite these 
sociocultural and other affinities, they shared no common 
understanding of the concept of self-determination and the bastion of 
fundamental entitlements flowing from it. If, as has been observed, 
conceptions of human rights are dependent upon each society’s 
“historical, cultural, and ideological underpinnings,” and people who 
share common background were irreconcilably at odds over a basic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 UDHR, supra note 22, at art. 1, 15. 
50 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 1057 U.N.T.S. 407. 
51 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 
2(2), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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human right,52 then, there is cause to worry about people in distant 
lands, particularly from non-Western traditions, who are being called 
upon to submit to ideas that have been crafted and ratified by 
Western powers as binding norms of international human rights law 
but which, in no way, reflect their own realities. This is problematic 
on several levels. 
 For analytical purposes, let us use Africa as representative of 
traditional societies and compare Africa’s basic concept of human 
rights to that of the Western world.53 The objective is to examine the 
core beliefs and praxis in both systems as a means of determining 
whether one has been relegated to the background in the 
development of human rights and if so, whether universality is a 
worthy appellation to a result that evolved from such process. In 
other words, lurking behind this comparative analysis is the question 
whether human rights could justifiably be said to have common 
meaning or foundation and, thus, universal validity or application? A 
plurality of African scholars would unhesitantly return a negative 
verdict. In fact, many perceive extant international human rights 
framework, completely divorced from contribution of substantive 
ideas from traditional societies, as a brazen Western imposition of 
their vision of human rights on the rest of humanity. But that is not 
all. As African anthropologist Asmarom Legesse painstakingly 
elucidates:  
 
Their [Western world] offense is simply the fact that 
they are still engaged in a civilizing mission vis–à–
vis the rest of mankind. They still define the problem 
of human rights as one of lack of proper political 
education in the underdeveloped world. They have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Peter Schwab & Adamantia Pollis, Preface, in TOWARD A HUMAN 
RIGHTS FRAMEWORK vii (Peter Schwab & Adamantia Pollis, eds., 1982).  
53 The choice of Africa as a worthwhile proxy is based on its embodiment 
of a feature that is shared by all traditional societies. It has been suggested that 
despite their differences, third world nations uniformly conceive of themselves 
primarily in terms of their group identity. Individuals are defined in terms of the 
kinship system (clan, village, tribe and so forth) and never as “an autonomous 
individual possessed of inherent, inalienable rights . . .” See Adamantia Pollis, 
Liberal, Socialist, and Third World Perspectives of Human Rights, in TOWARD A 
HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK, supra note 52, at 1, 16. 
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already succeeded in writing most of their values and 
code of ethics into the Universal Declaration [of 
Human Rights]. Hence, the human rights movement 
faces the danger of becoming an instrument of 
cultural imperialism. To the extent that the West fails 
to realize that other cultural traditions may be as 
deeply committed to rights, although approaching it 
from a different ethical perspective, to that extent the 
movement rests on false premises and tends to 
legitimize the behavior it seeks to eradicate.54   
 
Whilst most Western scholars might be uncomfortable with the tone 
of this characterization, its basic claim (supplantation of traditional 
or African conception of human rights with one grounded in the 
ontology and epistemology of Western industrial civilization) is 
evidently non-contestable. Consequently, the need to make amends is 
becoming increasingly appreciated. Philosopher Lewis Hinchman’s 
incisive essay was underscored by his “concern that the doctrine of 
human rights may imperceptibly degenerate into empty rhetoric 
unless it can be given a rational foundation in a more encompassing 
theory of man and nature.”55 By “a more encompassing theory,” 
Hinchman intends an exodus from the parochialism of “West is 
right” to a more cosmopolitan attitude, a kind of doctrinal 
enlargement, that readily admits the utility of hitherto neglected 
views, particularly from non-Western ontological frameworks, to 
continued evolution of human rights. 
 Empirically sound evidence showing that each culture 
maintains a distinct (in some material respect) conception of human 
rights is visible in State and regional practices. When African experts 
gathered in Dakar, Senegal in 1979, to prepare the draft of an African 
legal framework on human rights, their charge was straightforwardly 
Africentric: “to prepare an African human rights instrument based 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Asmarom Legesse, Human Rights in African Political Culture, in 
KENNETH W. THOMPSON, ED., THE MORAL IMPERATIVES OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
A WORLD SURVEY 130 (1980).  
55 Lewis P. Hinchman, The Origins of Human Rights: A Hegelian 
Perspective 37 WESTERN POL. Q. 7, 8 (1984). 
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upon an African legal philosophy and responsive to African needs.”56 
The experts wanted a legal regime that unambiguously reflected an 
“African conception of human rights.”57 With such a succinctly 
defined mandate, it stands to reason that the resulting draft would be 
a peculiarly African human rights charter that is clearly distinctive 
from, and uneclipsed by, alien human rights conceptualization. The 
preambular provisions of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights make it quite explicit that the document has been 
formulated by “[t]aking into consideration the virtues of [the] 
historical tradition and the values of African civilization which 
should inspire and characterize their reflection on the concept of 
human and peoples' rights.”58 
Indeed, the Charter is suffused with values that reflect quite 
clearly the worldview and cosmology of African traditional 
communities. A notable instance is the declaration that “the 
enjoyment of rights and freedoms also implies the performance of 
duties on the part of everyone.”59 Everyone owes these duties, 
specified in Chapter II of the Charter, to their family, society, and the 
State, as well as to other legally recognized communities and the 
international community.60 The African concept of duty as 
correlative to human rights is an important contribution to the 
development of international human rights law that parallels the 
American human rights system.61 It is also reflective of its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Yougindra Khushalani, Human Rights in Africa and Asia 4 HUM. RTS. 
L. J. 436 (1983), cited in James Silk, Traditional Culture and the Prospect for 
Human Rights in Africa, in ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA'IM & FRANCIS M. 
DENG, EDS., HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 290, 
308 (1990). 
57 EI-Obaid Ahmed EI-Obaid & Kwadwo Appiagyei-Atua, Human Rights 
in Africa – A New Perspective on Linking the Past to the Present 41 MCGILL L. J. 
819, 836 (1996) (quoting Amnesty International, The Organization of African 
Unity and Human Rights, Al Index IOR 03/04/87 (June 30, 1991), at 8.). 
58 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, OAU 
Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5.  
59 Id. at pmbl. 
60 Id. at art. 27(1). 
61 Contrary to widespread representations in human rights literature, the 
African Human Rights System was not the originator of the concept of duty as an 
essential component of human rights. Often lost in the analysis of the African 
Charter and its contribution to human rights development is the fact that the 
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concept of duty as integral to human rights protection is not unique to Africa. The 
idea traverses most, if not all, traditional societies. In fact, in the negotiations 
leading to the adoption of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man, traditional societies of Latin America were able to persuade its northern 
neighbors to incorporate duties as indispensable to the enjoyment of the rights 
specified in the Declaration. The Declaration’s two chapters were split between 
human rights (chapter I) and associated duties (chapter II). See the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by the 
Ninth International Conference of American States (1948), reprinted in Basic 
Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, 
OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 17 (1992). There has been a tendency to 
approach the Declaration as other declarations in international law, as having no 
binding legal effect. But this is wrong. The normative status of the provisions of 
the Declaration is atypical. The instrument, unlike other declarations, proclaims 
binding legal obligations for States Parties to the Organization of American States. 
See Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of 
Man Within the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, July 14, 1989, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) 
No. 10 (1989), particularly ¶¶ 42 – 47, Judgment available at  
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b_11_4j.htm (accessed May 15, 2013). The 
advisory opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights was quite 
illuminating: 
 
The General Assembly of the Organization has . . . repeatedly 
recognized that the American Declaration is a source of 
international obligations for the member states of the OAS . . . 
Hence it may be said that by means of an authoritative 
interpretation, the member states of the Organization have 
signaled their agreement that the Declaration contains and 
defines the fundamental human rights referred to in the Charter 
. . . Moreover, Articles 1(2)(b) and 20 of the Commission's 
Statute define the competence of that body with respect to the 
human rights enunciated in the Declaration, with the result that 
to this extent the American Declaration is for these States a 
source of international obligations related to the Charter of the 
Organization. 
The Court concludes: 
For the States Parties to the Convention, the specific source of 
their obligations with respect to the protection of human rights is, 
in principle, the Convention itself. It must be remembered, 
however, that, given the provisions of Article 29(d), these States 
cannot escape the obligations they have as members of the OAS 
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sociopolitical and moral epistemology and its concept of justice. 
Unpacking the African concept of justice requires a great deal of 
understanding of how Africans perceive man, his role in society and 
the obligations associated with membership of the community. It 
touches on the foundation of African morality. 
African ethics, no doubt, is boldly communitarian. The basic 
social unit in an African society is the community whose good, as 
conceived by them, incorporates those of its individual members. In 
African ontology, a person or personhood is defined in terms of 
affinity to family, clan, village and so forth, to which the individual 
owes his existence. This affinity or relationship not only gives 
individuals their identities but also structures their very existence. 
Noted African philosopher John Mbiti explains:  
 
Only in terms of other people does the individual 
become conscious of his own being, his own duties, 
his privileges and responsibilities towards himself and 
towards other people. When he suffers, he does not 
suffer alone but with his corporate group: when he 
rejoices, he rejoices not alone but with his kinsmen, 
his neighbours and his relatives . . . Whatever happens 
to the individual happens to the whole group, and 
whatever happens to the whole group happens to the 
individual. The individual can only say: “I am, 
because we are; and since we are therefore I am.” 
This is the cardinal point in the understanding of the 
African view of man.62  
 
This means, in essence, that Africans typically think of societal needs 
as definitive of their being and existence. There are, of course, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
under the Declaration, notwithstanding the fact that the 
Convention is the governing instrument for the States Parties 
thereto. That the Declaration is not a treaty does not, then, lead 
to the conclusion that it does not have legal effect, nor that the 
Court lacks the power to interpret it within the framework of the 
principles set out above. (Emphasis supplied). 
62 JOHN S. MBITI, AFRICAN RELIGIONS AND PHILOSOPHY 108 -109 
(1969). 
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individually centered desires and aspirations but they are inextricably 
woven with one another and collapsed into that of the broader group 
to which he or she belongs.  In this dynamic, “the reality of the 
communal world takes precedence over the reality of individual life 
histories whatever these may be,”63 a reason “group rights” are 
“stressed over individual rights.”64 In these societies, individual 
rights, either of civil and political (CIPO) rights or economic, social 
and cultural   (ECOSOC)  rights nature, are generally seen as 
aberrations,65 underscoring Legesse’s observation that had  Africans 
authored the UDHR, “they might have ranked the rights of 
communities above those of individuals.”66  
Moral decision-making and actions are constructed within 
group or collective platforms. Determination as to the 
appropriateness or rightness of an action is predicated on whether the 
conduct in question strengthens or damages the stability and 
cohesion of the community. Unlike people in other parts of the 
world, for Africans, asserting one’s rights as an individual “would be 
unthinkable;” such actions are seen as tantamount to undercutting 
“their dignity as group members.”67 This is the reason maxims such 
as “my business is nobody else’s business” is alien to Africa’s 
communitarian orientation. In fact, the reverse is true and uniformly 
accepted and imbedded in social structures throughout the region.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Ifeanyi A. Menkiti, Person and Community in African Traditional 
Thought, in RICHARD A. WRIGHT, ED., AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY: AN 
INTRODUCTION 157 (1979). 
64 Rhoda E. Howard, Group versus Individual Identity in the African 
Human Rights Debate on Human Rights, in AN-NA'IM &  DENG, supra note 56, at 
161. 
65 J. M. Zvogbo, A Third World View, in DONALD P. KOMMERS & 
GILBERT D. LOESCHER EDS., HUMAN RIGHTS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 
92 -103 (1979). 
66 Legesse, supra note 54 at 128; see also Virginia A. Leary, The Effect of 
Western Perspectives on International Human Rights, in AN-NA'IM & DENG, 
supra note 56, at 20 (reporting that of the seven principal drafters of the UDHR 
five are Westerners and two are non-Westerners who were educated in the West: 
René Cassin (France), John P. Humphrey (Canada), Eleanor Roosevelt (United 
States), Hernán Santa Cruz (Chile), Charles Malik(Lebanon) P.C. Chang (China) 
and Fernand Dehousse (Belgium)). 
67 Howard, supra note 64, at 166. 
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Two important cases decided by the United States Supreme 
Court are demonstrative of this point, namely, Griswold v. 
Connecticut (which held, for the first time, that marital privacy 
regarding use of contraceptives is a constitutionally protected right)68 
and Lawrence v. Texas (establishing, again for the first time, the right 
to consensual homosexual sex as a constitutional right encapsulated 
within the right to privacy).69 Had these cases been decided in a 
communal setting, the operational prism being that of communities 
insulated from the assault of Western modernity, the result would 
have certainly been different. The reason is because the ethics of 
communitarianism prescribes that “your business is my business” 
and vice versa, and this powerfully dilutes the force of privacy in 
individual lives. It would be odd in these societies to defend 
allegations of what is generally perceived as a wrongdoing on the 
basis of one’s self-contrived privacy interests. This underscores the 
uncompromising resistance, as shown subsequently, by the 
representative of traditional societies to homosexual and 
sexual/reproductive rights agenda of powerful forces at the UN. Not 
that privacy is unknown in traditional societies; instead, the point is 
that in such societies, the line between “my business” and “your 
business” is indelibly blurred. Indeed, in Africa, even love making 
and associated privileges are not matters exclusively within the 
private domains of the individuals concerned.70 
The sketch of communal life we just painted sharply contrasts 
with Western thought. The basic unit of society is not the community 
but the individual. The individual is seen as “an isolated and 
autonomous” being whose actions are guided primarily by self-
preservation.71 Under this construct, individuals are not submerged in 
the community; instead, and this is the key, each person retains an 
independent existence, free of encumbrance or imposition of 
communal expectations. In this universe: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 381 U.S. 479, 485 – 486 (1965). 
69 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
70 Benoit Ngom, Reflexions sur la Notion de Droits, in Howard, supra 
note 64, at 162. 
71 TOWARD A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK, supra note 52, at 7. 
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 [P]ersonhood seeks to protect the freedom of 
individuals to define themselves in contradistinction 
to the value of the society in which they happen to 
live. The premise of such freedom is an 
individualistic understanding of human self-
definition: a conception of self-definition as 
something that persons are, and should be, able to do 
apart from society.72 (Emphasis supplied). 
 
Writing from an African perspective, Legesse observes: 
 
In the liberal democracies of the Western World the 
ultimate repository of rights is the human person. 
The individual is held in a virtually saclarized 
position. There is a perpetual, and in our view 
obsessive, concern with the dignity of the individual, 
his worth, personal autonomy and property.73 
 
These postulations sharply contrast with a communitarian justice 
system that is “rooted not in individual claims against the state, but 
in the physical and psychic security of group membership.”74  To be 
sure, there is concern for communal well-being in Western liberal 
tradition, but such concern readily yields to individual goals where 
the two conflict. In other words, perception of individual goods as 
inextricably linked with that of the community is absent under this 
framework. Morality is constructed within this abstraction or 
detached position of self-interest, a reason the principle of autonomy 
is more a feature of individualistic societies than communalism. 
Reflecting on this emphasis on individual, as opposed to group or 
communal, rights makes it easy to understand the privacy guarantees 
recognized in the cases previously mentioned. This philosophic 
divide is at the root of the gulf in human rights protection in different 
parts of the world.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 MADELEINE SCHACHTER, INFORMATIONAL AND DECISIONAL 
PRIVACY 783 (2003). 
73 Legesse, supra note 54, at 124. 
74 Howard, supra note 64, at 166. 
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 A cursory look at regional human rights instruments reveals 
that each regime has charted its own distinctive course, addressing 
concerns and manifesting orientations shared by the people whose 
conduct it seeks to regulate. The first legally-binding human rights 
framework, the ECHR, is a great instantiation.75 Understanding the 
Eurocentric nature of the ECHR requires examination of the history 
of the instrument. One of the stated purposes of the Council of 
Europe, under whose aegis the ECHR was drafted, was “to achieve a 
greater unity between its Members for the purpose of safeguarding 
and realizing the ideals and principles which are their common 
heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress.”76 
Contracting States Parties recognized that operationalizing this 
purpose necessitates setting up an appropriate legal framework and 
institutionalization of implementing organs or bodies –a recognition 
that impelled the adoption of, inter alia, the ECHR in 1950. The 
preamble notes “the maintenance and further realization of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms” as one of the means of attaining 
the objectives of the Council of Europe.77 This leaves the nature of 
human rights aimed to be protected by the Convention undefined. Is 
it the type enshrined in the UDHR (inclusive of ECOSOC rights) or 
some other (narrower or broader) formulation? These are very 
critical concerns. 
 States Parties to the ECHR expressed the profound belief that 
fundamental freedoms are the foundation of justice and global peace 
and best maintained by an effective political democracy and “a 
common understanding and observance of the Human Rights upon 
which they depend.”78 They avowedly acknowledged that Europeans 
are “likeminded and have a common heritage of political traditions, 
ideals, freedom and the rule of law” and resolved “to take the first 
steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the Rights stated in 
the Universal Declaration.”79 The use of the term “certain of the 
Rights” of the UDHR was not happenstance. Rather, it reflects quite 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 ECHR, supra note 23. 
76 Statute of the Council of Europe art. 1, ETS No. 001  (August 3, 1949), 
available at conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/001.htm. 
77 ECHR, supra note 23, at pmbl., ¶3. 
78 Id.¶ 4 (italics supplied).    
79 Id.¶ 5 (italics supplied). 
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explicitly an indication that not all human rights will be accorded 
recognition, only those that are consistent with European beliefs and 
cultural heritage. There is no doubt, as legal scholar James Hart 
explains, that the reference in the Preamble to Europe’s “common 
heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law . . 
.” was an explicit indication “that one of the ECHR’s intentions is to 
delineate and embody the political and ethical culture of Western 
Europe” and, presumably, not that of any other peoples.80 To this 
extent, therefore, one could rightly characterize the ECHR as the first 
treaty-based challenge to the universality of human rights. 
 The UDHR accords recognition to CIPO as well as ECOSOC 
rights. Some of the rights the Declaration embodies include freedom 
from discrimination;81 right to life, liberty and security of the 
person;82 right to free speech;83 right to health;84 and, right to 
education,85 to name a few. These rights were intended by the 
General Assembly of the UN to serve “as a common standard of 
achievement for all peoples and all nations” and requires “every 
individual and every organ of society . . . to secure their universal 
and effective recognition and observance . . .”86 By “common 
standard,” the General Assembly signals its intention that global 
unity would characterize the internalization and operationalization of 
the Declaration, underscoring its projection of “a common 
understanding of these rights and freedoms” as being “of the greatest 
importance for the full realization of this pledge” by member nations 
of the UN.87  
Despite these provisions, which can be construed –and rightly 
so– as the first positivist appeal to universalize human rights, both 
doctrinally as well as in practice, Europe (a major influence during 
the negotiations that crystallized to the adoption of the UDHR) chose 
a different route to operationalize human rights in its territory, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 James W. Hart, The European Human Rights System 102 L. LIBRARY J. 
533, 538 (2010).   
81 UDHR, supra note 22, at art. 2. 
82 Id. at art. 3. 
83 Id. at art. 19. 
84 Id. at art. 25. 
85  Id. at art. 26. 
86 Id. at pmbl.    
87 Id. ¶ 7. 
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informed by shared (traditional) values in the region. In this context, 
the ECHR can be summed up as a “charter on CIPO rights,” a view 
that readily finds justification in the Convention’s implicit denial of 
ECOSOC rights. Although Europe’s decision to accord recognition 
to one genre of human rights can be assailed on a variety of grounds, 
one thing is undeniable: 1950 Europe conceptualized human rights as 
non-inclusive of ECOSOC rights. This apathy toward ECOSOC 
rights, explains political scientist Adamantia Pollis, stems from the 
European notion of the role of the state in the life of individuals as 
not inclusive of supplying the kinds of needs ECOSOC rights 
protect.88 This view flourished in that region for over a decade after 
the adoption of the ECHR– that is, until the European Social Charter 
came into being.89  The Charter consists of a number of ECOSOC 
rights such as the right to work90 and the right of mothers and 
children to social and economic protection.91 
The point of the preceding discussion is to demonstrate the 
conceptual challenges, the amorphousness, and the fluidity of human 
rights. Theoretical postulations and political posturing, regardless of 
packaging, are quite often at variance with practice. The idea of 
immutability of human rights is useful largely as a theoretical 
concept; in reality, it is nothing short of a pragmatic fiction. For 
example, despite attempts at their rehabilitation, neither the United 
States Bill of Rights (1789) nor the French Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and Citizen (1789) is truly a human rights charter. If not for 
anything else, the human rights they proclaimed were reserved for 
certain, not all, Homo sapiens in the respective territories.92 The fact 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 TOWARD A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK, supra note 52, at 8. 
89 European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 89, E.T.S. No. 
35, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/035.htm. 
90 Id. at art. 1. 
91 Id. at art. 17. 
92 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), for instance, held 
that African-Americans were not citizens and, therefore, lack legal standing to sue 
in federal court. Since they are not citizens, they are not, as in France, entitled to 
human rights. See also Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), which upheld 
racial segregation. It was not until December 18, 1865 that slavery was abolished 
by virtue of the ratification by the required three-quarters of the states of the 
Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See also TOWARD A 
HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK, supra note 52 at 1, 4  (noting that liberal theory 
denies autonomy to individuals deemed not to be in possession of “the rational 
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that the most basic element of human rights –universality –was 
lacking in these documents had zero effect on their projection as 
legitimate human rights instruments. No serious human rights 
scholar today would defend this blatant, but deliberate, omission.93  
Journeying to contemporary times, the European human 
rights system’s metamorphosis, from originally singling out CIPO 
rights as worthy of recognition, to subsequently broadening the 
umbrella to incorporate ECOSOC rights should be seen as an 
evolutionary process in human rights thinking in that part of the 
world. Is the evolution continuing or can it be held to have reached 
its penultimate maturation? The answer crucially hinges on who you 
ask. Defenders of the African Charter’s three-genre (CIPO, 
ECOSOC and solidarity/third generation) rights system might hold 
out hope that a future human rights treaty in Europe would, 
following Africa’s model, incorporate solidarity/third generation 
rights (rights to development, peace and to a healthy environment, 
for instance) within its arsenal of rights.94 On the other hand, 
Europeans might be resistant, dismissing such hopes as ill-founded, 
wishful thinking –a third world fantasy, so to say, since claims 
regarding these rights are still ubiquitously mired in controversy.95 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
faculties necessary for autonomy and the exercise of individual rights” such as 
slaves, women and children).  Until quite recently, most Western countries denied 
women equal right with men. 
93 The truth is that what we have today (the panoply of rights) bears no 
semblance to the original conception. Not only were the entitlements inherent in 
John Locke’s idea of natural justice restricted to life, liberty and property, he 
limited right holders to “propertied Christian men,” excluding everyone else. See 
JACK DONNELLY, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 60 (2003). For 
centuries, the political map of Europe accurately reflected this thinking, a thinking 
that survived largely because of its perfect harmony and alignment with prevailing 
traditional mores at the time. 
94 The African Charter, supra note 58, at art(s) 22 – 24. 
95  The literature on this genre of rights is vast and growing, but see in 
particular: Karel Vasak, A 30-year Struggle, THE UNESCO COURIER, 29 (Nov. 
1977); Karel Vasak, Pour une troisième génération des droits de l’homme, in 
CHRISTOPHE SWINARSKI ED., STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES 837 (1984); Stephen P. Marks, 
Emerging Human Rights: A New Generation for the 1980s? 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 
435 (1981); Philip Alston, A Third Generation of Solidarity Rights: Progressive 
Development or Obfuscation of International Human Rights Law? 29 NETH. INT’L 
L. REV. 307 (1982); Roland Y. Rich, The Right to Development as an Emerging 
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Who is right and who is wrong? The difficulty in arriving at a 
generally acceptable answer to this question critically illustrates the 
need for further dialogue on the multicultural roots of human rights.  
 
III. Universalism v. relativism: homosexuality as a proxy 
 
The “traditional values resolution” is the latest in a 
series of resolutions that edge the Human Rights 
Council closer to a relativist position on human 
rights. If we continue to go down this path then 
everything is potentially relative and determined by 
vague concepts such as culture and tradition. For 
those who are seen to exist outside the neatly defined 
parameters of culture, this is especially troubling. 
        
  –Graeme Reid 
 
There seems to be some consensus . . . that the 
concept of human rights as generally understood is 
historically a Western concept. The more troubling 
questions facing Westerners and non-Westerners 
alike pertain to whether contemporary international 
human rights instruments, given their Western 
biases, can be said to apply to peoples from non-
Western cultures. 
      
 – Josiah Cobbah 
 
Is moral (or cultural) relativism, the idea that morality is 
culture-specific or culture-contextual, a phony concept? The 
response to the question, again, depends on who you ask. For its 
proponents, the concept represents the only legitimate explanation of 
the variegated ways in which people in different communities or 
cultures think of moral issues, the implication being that people in 
one culture are decidedly not in a position to pass moral judgment on 
a different one. There is, in other words, no universal moral truth – 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Human Right, 23 VA. J. INT’L L. 287 (1983); Carl Wellman, Solidarity, the 
Individual and. Human Rights 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 639 (2000). 
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morality acquires its color or context via cultural values. Ever since 
anthropologists bestowed intellectual legitimacy on cultural 
relativism (although the idea itself is originally a philosophical 
doctrine), it has been the subject of scathing attacks –which is not 
quite surprising since it challenges extant orthodoxy. This is how 
anthropologist John R. Cole sees it: 
 
Cultural relativism . . . is the idea that one culture is 
not superior to and should not judge others. It may be 
the single most influential anthropological precept . . 
. To relativists, Western society, American politics 
and capitalism, and Judeo-Christian ideas of morality 
are not absolute or perfect any more than is New 
Guinea tribal life. To people committed to absolute 
standards defined by the will of God (or nature), 
relativism is a humbling, subversive doctrine. It 
removes an individual’s group from the pinnacle of 
culture, just as evolution’s demonstration that people 
are simply one more variety of animals removes 
humans from the other center of life.96 
 
Casting relativism as a “subversive doctrine” is one that readily 
appeals to absolutists. The reason is simple. Human beings, 
intellectually astute or otherwise, tend to arrogate primacy to their 
individual circumstances, whatever these may be. In Christianity, as 
in Islam, members of one sect or denomination tend to see the rest as 
inferior, confident that their doctrinal peculiarities provide the only 
“true” path to God and eternity. Yet, in the vast majority of cases, the 
faithfuls did not choose their religion, not to mention their sect. The 
choice was made by their parents even before they were born. One 
becomes a Shiite Muslim or Roman Catholic, not as a consequence 
of some autonomous intellectually-informed analysis, but owing to 
an amalgamation of circumstances, revolving primarily on 
circumstances of birth and other socioeconomic and political 
dynamics. One achieves membership of this or that sect because the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 John R. Cole, Scopes and Beyond: Antievolutionalism and American 
Culture, in LAURIE GODFREY, ED., SCIENTISTS CONFRONT CREATIONISM, 27 
(1983); JOHN COOK, MORALITY AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES 3 (1999). 
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individual’s parents made the choice, long before the person became 
capable of independent decision-making. These circumstances 
become the cradle of the individual’s moral orientation, his source of 
moral truth –a “high horse,” so to say, from which he confidently 
judges conflicting moral standards as inferior and in need of 
modification to suit his standards. A great illustration is a speech 
from the floor of the United States House of Representative a few 
years ago. Speaking in support of expelling a congressman from 
Massachusetts who had permitted homosexual activities in his home, 
William Dannemeyer, Congressman from California, intoned the 
views of most of his colleagues: 
 
The Judeo-Christian ethic on which this Nation was 
founded says very clearly that there are fixed 
standards which God gave to man to govern people 
in any society. The philosophy of moral relativism, 
on the other hand, says that there are no standards, 
that man himself is capable of establishing any rule 
at any time . . . do anything you want so long as the 
perception is that you are not harming anybody 
else.97 
 
Implicit in this statement is that, as far as Representative 
Dannemeyer is concerned, Judeo-Christian morality is the only 
standard against which human conduct should be assessed. It would 
not matter to him a bit if homosexual life is permissible under some 
other moral regimes. Dannemeyer and others of Judeo-Christian 
orientation would use their own standard to judge the actions of 
everyone else, even if those other people do not profess belief in a 
Judeo-Christian God. Whilst the congressman is at liberty to cling on 
to that belief, he steps into a murky zone when he asserts that 
relativists have no standards, implying that anything goes in those 
societies. This claim is simply untenable. Moral relativism embodies 
rules that prescribe standards, some of which have a longer 
genealogy than Judeo-Christian ethics. There seems to be only one 
difference, the point of reference on which these moral standards are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Congressional Record, H-5634, July 26, 1990, cited in JOHN COOK, 
MORALITY AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES 4 (1999). 
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anchored –on Abrahamic God or on some other supernatural being or 
framework. Absolutists are  not persuaded.  
Philosopher John W. Cook argues that conflicts regarding 
moral issues are not produced by the fact that the claimants are 
operating from different moral perspectives or principles; rather, at 
least one of the parties lacks what he terms “a sufficiently developed 
moral consciousness.”98 One is said to lack sufficiently developed 
moral consciousness when that person fails to honestly and carefully 
reflect on moral matters.99 Such persons are not morally thoughtful 
or insightful, and the difference between them and others cannot be 
explained on the basis of a clash of principles; the difference arises, 
instead, in the ways they “think about matters, in how earnestly, 
honestly, and diligently they think.”100  In other words, an earnest, 
honest and diligent reflection on moral matters will inevitably lead to 
universal truths as to what is right or wrong. That is, regardless of 
geography, philosophic or cultural background, anyone that thinks in 
the manner prescribed by Cook will invariably arrive at the same 
conclusion. This is a contestable claim.  
Perhaps, it could be said that the result of such reflection 
would be the same for people operating from the same moral horizon 
but certainly not for everyone. Thoughts and actions are produced, 
shaped and influenced by individual circumstances, the totality of 
one’s history and experiences. This is the reason one is more likely 
to find congruence of opinion regarding any moral issue amongst 
people that share some affinities, be it religion, culture or geography. 
For philosopher Tristram Engelhardt, there are two major competing 
moral standards, one articulated by believers in God and another by 
those that do not hold the same belief, a dichotomy he describes as 
Christian morality versus secular morality:101 “[f]or secular morality 
. . . , there is no equivalent of a God’s-eye perspective, a non-socio-
historically-conditioned standard to warrant particular moral content 
as canonical;” their morality  is “supported by nothing more than 
clusters of intuitions sustained by various narratives, all floating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 COOK, supra note 96, at 117. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 117. 
101 See generally H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, JR., THE FOUNDATIONS 
OF BIOETHICS (1996). 
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within the horizon of the finite and the immanent.”102 Because the 
source of moral authority differs, there are inevitably different moral 
standards claimed as valid by each group. As to why this is 
important, Engelhardt further elucidates: 
 
Among the consequences of this state of affairs is 
that the persistence of Christianity, or at least 
traditional Christianity, constitutes not just a cultural, 
but a political provocation to the now-dominant, 
secular culture and the secular state . . . [T]his is the 
case not only because the content of traditional 
Christianity morality . . . is in conflict with the 
content of secular morality . . . , but also because 
traditional Christianity has foundations that 
transcend the bounds of secular moral discourse and 
make it incapable of compromise within the secular 
politically rational. Claims by traditional Christianity 
of a transcendent ground for its morality . . . 
constitute for the secular culture and the secular state 
a disturbing fundamentalism.103 
 
Evidence of this perpetual friction between secular and Christian 
moralities can be found in such thorny issues as abortion, physician-
assisted suicide, euthanasia and homosexuality, each of which is 
supported by the former but condemned by the latter.104 The point, 
then, is that holding that human beings are products of their 
environments is really an admission of the obvious, that it is one’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., Secular Morality after Foundations: 
Moral Pluralism, Christianity, and the Culture Wars, 5 (Working Papers of the 
Centre for Advanced Study in Bioethics Münster 2012/38), available at 
 http://www.uni-muenster.de/imperia/md/content/kfg-
normenbegruendung/intern/publikationen/_fellows/38_engelhardt_-
_secular_morality_after_foundations.pdf. 
103 Id. at 5. 
104 Note that although physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia are 
related, they are distinct. In the former, the physician is not an active participant –
he merely provides the means or the information, leaving the actual act (ending 
life) to be performed by the patient whereas in the latter, the physician actually 
performs the act. 
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individual circumstances and societal influence that structure and 
condition the individual’s life, including his moral worldview, not 
the postulation espoused by Cook. So, how do we reconcile relativist 
and absolutist claims in order to produce a truly universal human 
rights regime? 
An apt way to begin discussion on the universality of human 
rights is to note, with some caution, a number of key statements in a 
paper whose professed aim was “to direct [human rights scholars] 
along a cross-cultural path” – that is, I think, a path to proper 
contextualization, understanding and operationalization of human 
rights:105 
 
In December 1948, at a time when most of the 
population of Africa south of the Sahara was still 
under colonial domination, a General Assembly 
dominated by the Western world adopted a Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights at the United Nations. 
There is no doubt that the Declaration was a product 
of Western liberal ideology.106 
 
The paper continues: 
 
It is usually argued that the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights together 
constitute an International Bill of Rights. If these 
international norms constitute customary 
international law then they bind people of all 
cultures. 107 
 
The question, then, becomes, should they? Perhaps, a few of the 
rights might appeal to all persons and all cultures, such as the right to 
life, whereas others might be contested. Even prior to this recent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Josiah A. M. Cobbah, African Values and the Human Rights Debate 9 
HUM. RTS. Q. 309, 310 (1987). 
106 Id. at 316. 
107 Id. 
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attempt at dialogue on the content of human rights, there has always 
been disagreement at the international level as to what constitute 
“true” human rights. The so-called “negative” and “positive” rights’ 
dichotomization reflected in the bifurcation of human rights into the 
ICCPR (dealing with the former genre of rights) and the ICESCR 
(enshrining the former) speaks quite ably to the disparate 
understanding of human rights in the Western world versus the 
communist bloc countries led by now-defunct Soviet Union. 
Although, at the time of negotiating the terms of these treaties, 
Western European nations were united against according recognition 
to ECOSOC rights as human rights, they have since had a rethinking 
on the subject.  
Could this attitudinal shift be linked to a new awakening, a 
kind of sociopolitical evolution in the region? Otherwise, how does 
one explain the new role of the State as a more committed partner in 
attending to the ECOSOC rights of the citizenry? Perhaps so, after 
all, as an astute observer helpfully puts it, “cultures can and do 
change; indeed, change is part of their nature as they are, above all, 
social creations.”108 Europe is not immune to cultural impermanence, 
neither are other regions. Regarding ECOSOC rights, Europe’s 
realization of what some may describe as the “folly of its ways” is 
demonstrated, as documented previously, by their adoption of the 
European Social Charter in 1961,109 proving that human rights, much 
like tradition and culture on which it depends for its legitimacy, is 
not static. Like culture, human rights “is in constant flux, adapting 
and reforming” to changing circumstances.110 In other words, “there 
is nothing inevitable or sacrosanct about human rights” that would 
make it aloof to changes in interpretations or practices necessitated 
by genuine human needs or concerns.111 There are, of course, 
scholars who would squabble over this claim, trumpeting the reverse. 
For their benefit, we seek insight from the on-going debate at the UN 
regarding homosexuality as a human right. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Howard, supra note 64, at 172. 
109 European Social Charter, supra note 89. 
110 Female Genital Mutilation: A Joint WHO/UNICEF/UNFPA 
Statement, WHO, 1-2 (1997), available at apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/41903. 
111 Hinchman, supra note 55, at 8. 
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 In a recently published paper, this author describes a hitherto 
condemned and criminalized112 sexual practice as an instance of an 
emerging (albeit disputed) human right, the ascendancy or triumph of 
secular humanism over religious morality: 
 
Historically, sexual intercourse was constructed as 
exclusive prerogative of a man and a woman. Sex 
between individuals of the same sex was considered 
immoral, perverse and against the laws of nature, and 
prohibited at the pain of harsh criminal penalties, 
calculated to deter the conduct, especially between 
males. Sodomy, derived from Ecclesiastical 
Latin peccatum Sodomiticum (Sin of Sodom), was 
condemned by all the world’s major religions . . . 
With shifting morality, however, the religiously 
embedded foundation of this injunction has rapidly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 See VA. CODE § 18.2-361 Crimes against Nature; penalty: 
 
A. If any person carnally knows in any manner any brute animal, or 
carnally knows any male or female person by the anus or by or with 
the mouth, or voluntarily submits to such carnal knowledge, he or she 
shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony, except as provided in subsection 
B. 
 
B. Any person who carnally knows by the anus or by or with the mouth 
his daughter or granddaughter, son or grandson, brother or sister, or 
father or mother shall be guilty of a Class 5 felony. However, if a 
parent or grandparent commits any such act with his child or 
grandchild and such child or grandchild is at least thirteen but less 
than eighteen years of age at the time of the offense, such parent or 
grandparent shall be guilty of a Class 3 felony. 
 
Richard Cornish was executed in 1624 in Virginia, the first person in the United 
States to suffer capital punishment for sodomy. See BETH MARSCHAK & ALEX 
LORCH, LESBIAN AND GAY RICHMOND (IMAGES OF AMERICA: VIRGINIA) 9 
(2008); see also Doe v. Commonwealth’s Attorney for the City of Richmond, 403 
F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), which upheld the law. See Sodomy Laws: Virginia, 
GAY AND LESBIAN ARCHIVES OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST, 
http://www.glapn.org/sodomylaws/usa/virginia/virginia.htm (last visited June 29, 
2013). 
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weakened, and attitudes are beginning to soften, 
particularly in Europe and the North America.113 
 
To illustrate this shifting attitude, the paper points to the 2003 
ordination of Gene Robinson, an openly gay man, as the Bishop of 
New Hampshire, by a major Christian denomination (the Episcopal 
or Anglican church). Continuing, the paper cautions: 
 
As the cloak of deviancy is surreptitiously stripped 
off homosexuality by the protestant churches in the 
United States, so also is the connotation of iniquity 
with which gay sex was once associated in secular 
world being eroded.  Lawrence v. Texas is a 
landmark case in the annals of American 
constitutional law . . . For the first time ever, the 
United States Supreme Court held that private sexual 
intercourse between two consenting gay men is a 
constitutionally protected liberty under the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
explicitly overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, where the 
Court had earlier denied constitutional protection to 
exactly the same conduct. .  . Howsoever one reads 
the judgment, it is fairly apparent that what was once 
profane and perverse is gradually and steadily 
sauntering into the American mainstream. 114 
  
This seems to be the point Hinchman was making in asserting that 
the “position of an ‘immoralist’ such as Thrasymachus in Plato's 
Republic ” is not only “always a possibility” but “indeed may even 
now represent the “true” opinions of more than a few Americans” 
and, if I may add, many others in different parts of the world.115 
Translation: what was considered loathsome, immoral, or even 
criminal in yesteryears might become tomorrow’s human rights.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Obiajulu Nnamuchi, Hands Off My Pudendum: A Critique of Human 
Rights Approach to Female Genital Ritual, 15 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L. J. 243, 
281-82 (2012). 
114 Id. at 282. 
115 Hinchman, supra note 55, at 8. 
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Homosexuality is an appropriate subject for evaluating claims 
relating to the universality of human rights for a number of reasons. 
Not only is it a topical issue – and this is very crucial – but it also 
reveals also most vividly the sharp distinctions in value systems even 
amongst people from within the same geographic locality. The gay 
rights activist Graeme Reid was indeed right, “sexuality [has] 
become one of the fissures with the U.N. Human Rights Council and 
beyond –an ongoing battle around . . . the rights of LGBT people.”116 
Although Reid apparently disagrees with a recent description by 
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov of LGBT rights as “nothing 
but an outside “appendage to the universal values,”117 in so stating, 
Lavrov was speaking for most of his countrymen. Value systems are 
undeniably offshoots of cultural orientations, and the orientations 
themselves often differ as a result of disparate affiliations, some of 
them religious, others secularly driven.  
Although each country retains a dominant value system or 
some form of common morality that undergirds national actions, it is 
incorrect to claim homogeneity (in ideas or attitudes, for instance) 
amongst the various sub-units that make up the whole. In practice, 
minority views are usually wrapped up in some sort of democratic 
garb and fused with the views of the majority in order to come up 
with a single national platform. The reach of this democratic process 
varies depending on the sensitivity of the subject in question and the 
underlying values. Homosexuality, again, is quite illustrative. We 
begin from internal (within national boundaries) dissention and 
extend our analysis globally.  
Since slavery, there has not been an issue that has been as 
divisive in the United States as homosexuality and its place in 
national life. The issue has pitted different segments of the country 
against each other – the Northern part of the country against the 
South, conservative Christians against progressive ones, political 
conservatives against liberals (left-leaning political views) and so 
forth. Nine out of the fifty states (in addition to Washington D.C) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Graeme Reid, Traditional Values’ Code for Human Rights Abuse? 
CNN.COM Oct. 17, 2012, available at  
http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/10/17/traditional-values-code-for-
human-rights-abuse/ (last visited August 15, 2013). 
117 Id. 
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that comprise the Union recognize same-sex or homosexual/lesbian 
marriage.118 It is striking that the vast majority of states in which the 
imprimatur of law has been bestowed upon same-sex marriage are 
located mainly in the Northeast corner of the United States, the 
mostly liberal (secular) part of the country. This is no coincidence. It 
signifies, quite strongly, the relationship between traditional values 
and human rights or, to put it more precisely, the role of tradition and 
culture in the politics of homosexual agenda. This is explicative of 
Southern states’ (otherwise known as the “Bible belt”) aloofness or 
imperviousness to this development.119 While secular morality, 
visibly evident in liberal states in the Northeast and Northwest, is 
welcoming of all forms of “alternative lifestyles,” the Bible belt 
states frown upon non-heterosexual relationships as incompatible 
with their Christian-centered ethics. A Pew Research Center survey 
published in November 2012 documents that, in contrast to trends in 
other regions, the majority of the residents of Southern states 
resolutely oppose the measure.120 For instance, 56% of the people in 
Alabama, Kentucky, Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas oppose same-
sex marriage and only about 35% favor it.121 
Even amongst people sharing the same faith, other non-
religious values might operate to shape their views regarding human 
rights. Aside from the previously discussed ordination of a gay 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Marriage Center, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, 
http://www.hrc.org/marriage-center (last visited Aug. 15, 2013) (The states include 
Connecticut, Maryland, Washington, Iowa, Vermont, New Hampshire, Maine, 
Massachusetts and New York). 
119 David Usborne & Stephen Foley, Barack Obama Defies Bible Belt 
with Support for Gay Marriage, THE INDEPENDENT, May 10, 2012, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/barack-obama-defies-bible-
belt-with-support-for-gay-marriage-7729226.html (quoting President Obama: “[a]ll 
the so-called "Bible Belt" states in the south-eastern US have now taken similar 
steps; 29 US states have passed constitutional amendments barring same-sex 
marriage.”). 
120 Behind Gay Marriage Momentum, Regional Gaps Persist: Two-to-One 
Support in New England, Opposition in South, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Nov. 9, 
2012, http://www.people-press.org/2012/11/09/behind-gay-marriage-momentum-
regional-gaps-persist/. 
121 Id. 
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Bishop in New Hampshire,122 this is further exemplified by the 
controversy that greeted the blessing of same-sex unions in 
Vancouver, Canada123 as well as the church leadership in England’s 
support for the ordination of gay bishops.124 This support, according 
to reports, is “likely to reignite one of the Anglican community's 
most bitter internal debates.”125 Quite unsurprisingly, evangelical 
(conservative) Anglicans wasted no time in voicing their 
disapproval.126 While the Anglican Communion in England and the 
Episcopal Church in North America (both with liberals at the helm) 
saw nothing inimical with permitting homosexuals to occupy 
leadership positions in the church, their more conservative 
doctrinally astute brethren in distant lands, including Africa, Asia 
and South America, are adamant in their resistance, believing that 
homosexuality is irredeemably irreconcilable with their articles of 
faith. How does one reconcile this divergence in moral thought 
amongst adherents of the same faith? Or, rather, what is responsible 
for the divergence? 
The simple response is that although adherents of the 
Anglican faith are, at least in theory, doctrinally homogenous, the 
extent to which the shared doctrine is internalized is highly 
dependent on the prevailing extra-religious mores in individual 
societies. Call it civilization or anything else, but the fact remains 
that secularism has eaten deep into the fabric of religious institutions 
in the Western world, particularly Europe. Self-idolation, the 
inevitable result of unbridled permissiveness, what some people refer 
to as “moral decadence,” has its consequences. Consider these facts: 
in 1910, 66.3% of the world’s Christians were Europeans; 
nonetheless, by 2010, the number plunged to 25.9%, a decline of 
more than 50%.127  Although a number of reasons could be advanced 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Laurie Goldstein, First Openly Gay Episcopal Bishop to Retire, N. Y. 
TIMES, (Nov. 6, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/07/us/07bishop.html. 
123 Atila S. Guimarães, Anti-Anglo Anglican 'Church', Sept. 2, 2003, 
http://www.traditioninaction.org/HotTopics/b01sCrisis_AntiAnglo.html. 
124 Peter Walker, Church of England Rules Gay Men in Civil Partnerships 
can Become Bishops, GUARDIAN, Jan. 4 2013,  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/04/church-of-england-gay-bishops. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Global Christianity: A Report on the Size and Distribution 
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in explanation of this reversal in the fortunes of the church in 
Europe, one thing is quite undeniable: what is being experienced, 
howsoever exotic the terminology, is nothing short of “chickens 
coming home to roost,” a bountiful harvest, reaping the fruits of the 
triumph of secular humanism over traditional values – the 
“connivance at individualism and hedonism on the scale of society 
and state and ultimately on the scale of the whole humanity.”128 
 Stepping aside from North America and Europe reveals 
something quite remarkably different. Conservatism, the near-
universal adherence to traditional values, takes center stage most 
glaringly in the churches, and this is the reason several Bishops, most 
notably Peter Akinyola, the Archbishop of Lagos and then Primate of 
the Nigeria Anglican Communion, held nothing back in lashing out 
against what he perceives as the Western Anglican Communion 
Church’s unapologetic slide toward Gomorrah: “This is an attack on 
the Church of God —a Satanic attack on God's Church.”129 A 
statement at a 2007 award ceremony lauding the Primate for 
demonstrating an “uncommon initiative, drive and  . . . leadership” 
was quite explicit, “[c]alled a bigot by some in the Anglican Church, 
his attitudes nevertheless represent a deep-rooted conservative 
tradition in African Christianity that is flourishing and growing.”130 
Yes, the Primate may be demonized as a bigot in some quarters but 
he remains undeterred.  His resolutely unyielding stance strongly 
reflects the doctrine of the church as understood, practiced and 
propagated by the flock under his shepherdship. And here is the 
uncanny paradox: in contrast to steadily declining pews in Europe 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of the World’s Christian Population, PEW RESEARCH CENTER15 (2011), 
http://www.pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/Topics/Religious_Affiliation/Christian/C
hristianity-fullreport-web.pdf. 
128 RUSS. ORTHODOX CHURCH, Statement by Communication Service of 
Moscow Patriarchate Department for External Church Relations on recent 
changes in family laws in France and Great Britain, (March 5 2013),  
https://mospat.ru/en/2013/03/05/news82106/. 
129 Philip Jenkins, Why all Anglican Eyes in London are Nervously Fixed 
on a Powerful African Archbishop, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY (Nov. 2003) 
http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/2003/11/jenkins.htm. 
130 ALL AFRICA GLOBAL MEDIA, National Champions, World Class 
Brands (Jan. 5, 2007), available at 
http://sip-trunking.tmcnet.com/news/2007/01/05/2216957.htm. 
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and North America, sub-Sahara Africa’s share of global Christian 
population continues to witness an astronomical upswing, jolting 
from 1.4% in 1910 to 23.6% in 2010,131 with most of the new 
converts residing in the embattled Primate’s homeland, Nigeria.132 
 Outside the realm of Christian ecumenism, the controversy 
shows no sign of abating, particularly at the intergovernmental level. 
A stark illustration is a report presented by the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Education, Vernor Muñoz, to the UN 
General Assembly in 2010.133 Hostility to the Report centered on, 
inter alia, the Rapporteur’s explicit references to, and reliance on, 
the Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human 
Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity134 
as setting a human rights standard.135 On this critical point, most of 
the members of the Third Committee of the General Assembly 
completely disagreed. Apart from criticizing him for “indulging in a 
twisted interpretation” of the statements of treaty-monitoring bodies, 
the vast majority of States distanced themselves from his claim that 
sexual education is a human right.136 African, Islamic, Arab and 
Caribbean States of the Third Committee voted to reject the 
Report.137 Even the EU was of the opinion that although 
comprehensive sexual education was indispensable to the enjoyment 
of a wide range of other human rights, it was wrong to regard it as a 
human right.138 The United States also opposed the notion of 
according human right status to sexual education.139 A statement 
attributed to the representative of Malawi (on behalf of African 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Global Christianity, supra note 127, at 9. 
132 Id. at 74. 
133 U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the United Nations Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Education, UN Doc.  A/65/162 (July 23, 2010). 
134 See YOGYAKARTA PRINCIPLES, http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org 
(last visited Aug. 15, 2013).  
135 Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Education, supra note 133, at ¶¶ 23, 67. 
136 INT’L SERVICE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS [ISHR], Majority of GA Third 
Committee Unable to Accept Report on the Human Right to Sexual Education (Oct. 
26, 2010), http://www.ishr.ch/archive-general-assembly/933-majority-of-ga-third-
committee-unable-to-accept-report-on-the-human-right-to-sexual-education. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
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Group) captures the sentiment of most States. The representative 
charges that the Special Rapporteur:  
 
[H]ad sought to: over-step the terms of his mandate; 
introduce ‘controversial concepts’ that were not 
recognized under international law; create new 
human rights; relied on information from non-
credible sources that was not verified; failed to 
incorporate information provided by Member States; 
selectively quoted from the work of the treaty bodies 
in a manner that distorted their views; and sought to 
propagate controversial principles (the Yogyakarta 
Principles) that were not endorsed at the international 
level. Each of these criticisms was in contravention 
of the Code of Conduct and if left unchecked, would 
undermine the entire system of special procedures.140  
 
It is striking that only a handful of States (Canada, Costa 
Rica, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Sweden) endorsed the Report. The 
question, then, becomes: has anything changed since 2010 when the 
Report of the Special Rapporteur was overwhelmingly rejected at the 
intergovernmental level? Hardly. A Report of the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights titled 
“Technical Guidance on the Application of a Human Rights-Based 
Approach to the Implementation of Policies and Programmes to 
Reduce Preventable Maternal Morbidity and Mortality” presented 
two years later suffered similar fate.141 A claim in the Report that 
“human rights law includes fundamental commitments of States to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Id; see also Press Release, Twenty-Six Years After UN Treaty Aimed 
at Absolute Prohibition of Torture Adopted, U.N. Press Release SHC/3987 (Oct. 
25 2010) http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/gashc3987.doc.htm (crediting 
this statement to the Caribbean Community (CARICOM): we “wish to put on 
record our strong disapproval of this attempt by the Special Rapporteur to create a 
new right within the universally established right to education, far exceeding his 
mandate.”). 
141 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Technical Guidance on the 
Application of a Human Rights-Based Approach to the Implementation of Policies 
and Programmes to Reduce Preventable Maternal Morbidity and Mortality, UN 
Doc. A/HRC/21/22 (July 2, 2012). 
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enable women to survive pregnancy and childbirth as part of their 
enjoyment of sexual and reproductive health rights . . .” 142 was 
roundly rejected by a group of Arab, Islamic, and African States on 
the ground that “no international consensus on sexual rights” 
exists.143 
 Recall that in 2008, France, in league with an assorted mix of 
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Gabon, Japan and Norway) successfully 
brought a Declaration on Human Rights and Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity before the 63rd session of the General Assembly of 
the UN.144 Drafted in response to what the sponsors saw as rising 
discrimination against individuals based on their sexual 
orientation,145 the Declaration seeks to outlaw death penalty, 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, the practice of torture 
and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment and 
so forth as punishment for homosexuality.146 In what seemed like a 
Goliath versus Goliath affair, the initiative had large cohorts of 
supporters (66 States) and substantial opposition (60 States, led by 
Syria).147 A statement from the latter camp casts the measure as 
“attempts to create ‘new rights’ or ‘new standards,’ by 
misinterpreting the Universal Declaration and other international 
treaties as inclusive of notions that were never articulated nor agreed 
to by the general membership,” a situation that risks “seriously 
jeopardiz[ing] the entire international human rights framework.”148 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 ISHR, supra note 136, at ¶ 8. 
143 Human Rights Monitor Quarterly, Human Rights Council Worrying 
Signs of Regression at 21st Session Issue 4, 2012, at 6. 
144 Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, FRANCE AT THE UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.franceonu.org/france-at-the-united-nations/thematic-files/rule-of-law-
human-rights/sexual-orientation-and-gender/article/sexual-orientation-and-gender 
(last visited Aug. 15, 2013). 
145 Annex to the Letter dated 18 December 2008 from the Permanent 
Representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Croatia, France, Gabon, Japan, the 
Netherlands and Norway to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the 
General Assembly (Dec. 22, 2008). 
146  Id.   
147 Patrick Worsnip, U.N. Divided Over Gay Rights Declaration, 
REUTERS (Dec 18, 2008), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/12/18/us-un-
homosexuality-idUSTRE4BH7EW20081218. 
148 Id. 
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The acrimony translates essentially to saying homosexuality is not a 
human right. 
To conclude this section, we consider a criticism by a leading 
LGBT activist of what he perceives as a “pernicious development” – 
a reference to anti-homosexual laws that have recently been, or on 
the precipice of being, enacted by a number of Eastern European 
countries.149 Graeme Reid faults these statutes for not only conflating 
homosexuality with pedophilia but for also “creating distorted 
perceptions about social equality of traditional and non-traditional 
family relationships.”150 To the extent that Reid argues against 
lumping pedophiles together with homosexuals, he is completely 
right. Because the two are clearly distinguishable, painting them with 
one large brush is indefensible. Nonetheless, what the activist fails to 
realize, and this is a very serious omission on his part, is that what he 
calls “distorted perceptions” is not really seen as such by the vast 
majority of the people in the countries whose statutory frameworks 
he vociferously maligns. In fact, for those opposed to the 
homosexual agenda, any attempt to place homosexual relationships 
on the same social scale as traditional types is seen as a threat to 
community cohesion and a distortion of social equilibrium with 
grave consequences. And this is the reason for their resistance. In 
fact, the vast majority of Russians, three-quarters, equates 
homosexuality to illness or considers it an aberration.151 In apparent 
disagreement, Reid argues that traditional values are neither 
“inherently and invariably good” nor “positive and affirming.”152 
Ostensibly oblivious to what the defenders of traditional values are 
thinking, he proceeds to describe his clamor for homosexual equality 
as reflecting “universal core values, which transcend differences in 
culture, religion and tradition.”153 This is obviously a wildly spurious 
claim. 
The fact that these laws were approved by the population in 
these countries (by virtue of enactment by democratically-elected 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Reid, supra note 116. 
150 Id. 
151 Q&A: Gay rights in Russia, BBC NEWS (Aug. 9, 2013) 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-23604142. 
152 Reid, supra note 116. 
153  Id. 
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legislative bodies) is an incontrovertible repudiation of the 
universality of the right Reid seems to claim. Moreover, an official 
statement recently released by the Russian Orthodox Church, to 
which the vast majority of residents of the countries under assault 
belong, warns against misrepresentation of the voice of the people: 
 
The legalization of same-sex unions is another step 
towards an attempt to give an absolutely new 
meaning to marriage and the family . . . In the 
countries which have embarked on the path of a 
radical revision of traditional family ethics, this 
process has resulted in a demographic crisis which is 
growing from year to year. The revision of 
fundamental norms of family law on which the 
human community has been built for centuries and 
which are preserved as before in the moral code of 
major world religions is a path leading to the self-
liquidation of whole nations.154 
 
Would Reid and his supporters share this perspective? The answer 
must be no. So, what to do? A resolution might arise from a diligent 
and honest search for consensus on the universality of human rights. 
 
IV. Why incorporating traditional values is critical: the 
case of female genital ritual 
 
The preceding sections, although tending to validate the 
critical relationship between traditional values and human rights, 
have been constructed within the contours of current realities at the 
UN. In this section, we examine a topic on which a lot of ink has 
been spilled, a movement to force population-wide attitudinal 
changes, even though the changes sought are sharply dichotomous 
from, and in fact destructive of, the culture in targeted countries. The 
woeful failure of statutory frameworks and international law to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Russian Orthodox Church, Statement by Communication Service of 
Moscow Patriarchate Department for External Church Relations on recent 
changes in family laws in France and Great Britain (March 5, 2013), 
https://mospat.ru/en/2013/03/05/news82106/ 
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extirpate female genital ritual (FGR) (also called female genital 
cutting or female circumcision) is a great lesson in anthropo-legal 
scholarship. The very few published works that are elucidatory of 
this failure are important resources for experts charged with advising 
the UNHRC on the role of traditional values in future development 
of human rights. 
Different people might project different reasons as 
explicatory of this failure but the most critical, by far, rests on the 
perceived disdain for the cultural sensibilities of the practitioners, 
utter disrespect for traditional values underpinning the practice. What 
the abolition bandwagon does not seem to appreciate is that human 
rights, regardless of locus, do not exist in vacuum. This is 
pragmatism, not theoretical postulation. To survive, to gain 
legitimacy in the sense of being internalized (compliance borne out 
of a sense of belief in the legitimacy of the law in question and not 
out of coercion or impelled by fear of criminal sanction), human 
rights must be anchored on a strong foundation, some value system –
a key ingredient of normative legitimacy. Undergirding a 
community’s value system is its tradition or culture. This much is 
incontrovertible. Difficulty arises when the culture or tradition in 
question is claimed by the so-called primitive societies. Such claims 
are almost always dismissed as ungrounded in reason, at least not the 
kind of reason that is conducive to human rights.  But the question is: 
whose human rights? If, as has been argued, human rights are a 
“cultural artifact,” constructed within the boundaries of a particular 
value system,155 then the current practice of ignoring some cultures 
but embracing others, depending on their regions of origin or people 
affected, cannot be justified. It is in this context that opposition to the 
current process at the UNHRC should be explored. 
As evident in the introductory section, this paper originates 
out of a deeply troubling concern for the growing attack against the 
on-going process of integrating traditional values into the corpus of 
global human rights.  As in years past, the position espoused by the 
United States and Europe is seen in many quarters, especially in 
mainstream scholarship, as representative of the “correct” path, 
irrespective of the numerical strength of States in the opposition 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155  Stephen J. Toope, Cultural Diversity and Human Rights 42 MCGILL 
L.J. 169, 177 (1997). 
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camp or even the cogency of their stance. Apart from being dubbed a 
vague concept,156 it is claimed that: 
 
Traditional values often impose patriarchal, mono-
cultural norms that discriminate against minority and 
marginali[z]ed individuals, be they indigenous 
people, persons with a disability, individuals with a 
non-conforming gender identity, or religious 
minorities.157 
 
This claim is contestable. First, it is overly broad; not all traditional 
values are oppressive. Second, the claim implicitly denies the origin 
of human rights: traditional values. Legal scholar Stephen J. Toope 
posits, “it is helpful to admit frankly that the language of [human] 
rights is Western in its philosophical roots.”158  These “roots,” to be 
sure, are quintessentially bold offshoots of European traditional 
values, having as its goal the promotion of “human freedom and the 
desire to promote physical, intellectual and spiritual 
development.”159  From its earliest beginning, the root of respect for 
and observance of human rights in every society, Western world 
included, was tradition, whether religiously imbedded or rooted in 
secular humanism.160 In the realm of human rights, the operative 
value system was Judeo-Christian, the dominant religious worldview 
in both Europe and in North America, the regions from which the 
world received human rights.  
Are religion and tradition not close cultural kin? The world’s 
major religions aspire to dominate the lives of practitioners by 
commanding complete submission to their rules and precepts; that is, 
unreserved obedience to one’s religious traditions. The Holy texts, be 
it the Bible or the Qur’an, are, in fact, compilations of rules of 
conduct as transmitted by messengers of God, books of traditional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 HRC 16/37, supra note 6, at ¶ 42. 
157 Human Rights Council must take an Unequivocal Stand against 
Traditional Values, INTERNATIONAL SERVICE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, (March 18, 
2013) http://www.ishr.ch/council/376-council/1478-human-rights-council-must-
take-an-unequivocal-stand-against-traditional-values. 
158 Toope, supra note 155, at 184. 
159 Id. 
160 HRC 16/37, supra note 6, at ¶ 10.  
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rules to be observed in order to become eligible for the rewards and 
promises of the text. Moral excellence in Islamic faith is attained 
when one is able to channel one’s intellectual resources toward 
ensuring conformity with God’s commandments as revealed in the 
Qur’an.161 In fact, “Islam” has been equated to “a way of life” which 
“provides guidance in all spheres of a person’s life, be they 
individual or collective.” 162 
 Islam is used in the preceding paragraph to emphasize only 
the central place of tradition or culture in people’s lives, not Islam’s 
universal acceptance as worthy of providing support for human 
rights. In short, Islamic traditions are held to the same disdainful 
standard as others of non-Western origin. The “West is right” 
mindset majestically reigns supreme, even in human rights theory 
and practice. Development economist William Easterly describes this 
mindset as the “West’s self-pleasing fantasy that “we” were the 
chosen ones to save the Rest.”163 To save the rest of humanity, 
Easterly explains, the West must project the rest of the world as a 
“blank state –without any meaningful history or institutions of its 
own –upon which the West could inscribe its superior ideals.”164 
Sharing this view is a recent work, which asserts: 
 
Evidence of this racial superciliousness and 
Eurocentrism abound, and understanding its 
historical, philosophical and ideological 
underpinnings is crucial to proper contextualization 
of Western opposition to cultural expressions that 
insufficiently measure up to what they conceive as 
proper ethical orientation. It boils down to how one 
culture perceives the “other.”165 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 AZAM BEG, ISLAM THE WAY OF LIFE: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION 1 
(2005), available at 
 http://www.scholaris.com/islam/learning/PDF/IslamTheWayOfLife.pdf. 
162 Id. 
163 WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN: WHY THE 
WEST'S EFFORTS TO AID THE REST HAVE DONE SO MUCH ILL AND SO LITTLE 
GOOD 23 (2006).   
164 Id. 
165 Obiajulu Nnamuchi, The Goose and the Gander: A Jurisprudential 
Defense of Medicalization of Female 
 
 
 
 
70 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. Vol. XIV 
	  
	  
70	  
	  
 
To be sure, the way one culture sees the “other” has significant 
ramification for human rights. The author continues:   
 
Indeed, it is this sort of mindset that informs 
widespread dismissive attitude of Western 
commentators (and their governments) of the claim 
that the wants of women and girls in FGR-practicing 
communities are at variance with the solutions they 
propagate. As in the colonial days, they “know 
better.” 166 
 
Rationales undergirding FGR are many and varied.167 Some 
justify the procedure as religiously ordained, whereas others justify it 
on the basis of chastity, cleanliness and aesthetic of the vagina and 
surrounding areas.168 Yet, others justify the practice as a cultural 
edict. Although several authors have disputed these benefits, their 
conclusions were based on second-hand information, regurgitations 
of individuals lacking personal experience of, or intimate familiarity 
with, the cultural rite. It was not until 2001 that a publication by 
anthropologist Rogaia Mustafa Abusharaf unearthed the views of 
women in the Sudan about FGR169 who have personal experience of 
the practice in a study designed to provide “an understanding of the 
ritual as presented in women’s own words, which reflect their own 
truths.”170 But despite the testimonies of these women, explaining the 
metaphysical underpinnings of their belief and, hence, support for 
continuation of the practice, the current global coalition remains 
undeterred in their bid to extirpate the practice.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Genital Ritual, J. MED. & L. (forthcoming, 2013). 
166 Id. 
167 Obiajulu Nnamuchi, Harm or Benefit? Hate or Affection? Is Parental 
Consent to Female Genital Ritual Ever Defensible? 8 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL 
L.  377, 403 – 16 (2013). 
168 Id.  
169 Rogaia Mustafa Abusharaf, Virtuous Cuts: Female Genital 
Circumcision in an African Ontology 12 DIFFERENCES: A JOURNAL OF FEMINIST 
CULTURAL STUDIES 112, 121 – 35 (2001). 
170 Id. at 122. 
 
 
 
 
71 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. Vol. XIV 
	  
	  
71	  
	  
When in 1996 the United States Congress decided to outlaw 
FGR, not even a single woman from the immigrant community was 
invited to testify; yet, it was their culture that was under assault by 
the lawmakers. Quite unsurprisingly, the law that resulted from this 
flawed process, Criminalization of Female Genital Mutilation Act,171 
made no provision for the special circumstances of adults who might 
wish to partake in the cultural rite. Unconcerned about agency and 
autonomy, implicit in adulthood, the statute fails to disaggregate 
women from children; meaning that reflectively and autonomously 
expressed preferences of competent rational adults are immaterial to 
a finding of culpability under this particular statutory framework.172 
Yet, as human rights scholar Michael Ignatieff ably notes, “[b]ecause 
the very purpose of rights language is to protect and enhance 
individual agency, human rights advocates must, if they are to avoid 
contradicting their own principles, respect autonomy of those agents” 
for whose protection they purport to act.173 Yes, the lawmakers 
would attempt to justify the statute as protecting the human rights of 
women in “barbaric” cultures; nonetheless, when fully examined, the 
law would be seen to do very little. What human rights apologists 
succeed in doing, in cases such as the one under consideration, is 
violating the human rights of the very people they purport to 
protect.174 
In reality, what such legislative frameworks wound up 
achieving is placing women “between the deep sea and the devil;” 
that is, comply with the law and risk alienation from their community 
or defy the law and face the wrath of the criminal justice system.  As 
to whether this is really the best way to promote the human rights of 
women in FGR-practicing communities, political scientist Amy 
Gutmann explains, “oppressed women typically want their rights as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 645, 110 Stat. 3009-708, (1996) (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 116). 
172 Nnamuchi, Hands Off My Pudendum, supra note 113, at 271 
(commenting, in relation to this genre of legal frameworks, “[t]his is a startling 
development in international legal discourse as never before has consent, in respect 
to competent adults, been dismissed as irrelevant to the question of culpability”); 
see also WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 107 – 31 (1995). 
173 MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY 18 
(2001). 
174 Nnamuchi, Hands Off My Pudendum, supra note 114, at 243. 
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individuals to be secured within their own culture, not at the expense 
of exile from their culture, or the destruction of what they and others 
take to be valuable about their culture.”175 Moreover, as 
anthropologist Carlos Sulkin admonishes, in dealing with an 
unfamiliar cultural practice, efforts should be directed toward 
soliciting the views of the people themselves, what they “say and do” 
about the particular practice in question whilst avoiding a “know it 
all” condemnatory attitude.176 But that was not the path the United 
States and indeed the vast majority of FGR-criminalizing nations 
chose. Blanket prohibition seems to be the order of the day. 
 The difficulty with this kind of legal framework –that is, one 
that is insensitive to the cultural underpinnings of the prohibited 
conduct –is that it achieves little, if anything at all. Proof is the 
woeful failure of anti-FGR legal regimes to stamp out the practice. 
For instance, anthropologist Michelle Johnson reports that in 
response to a threat to ban FGR, women in the town of Mansoa, 
Guinea Bissau, organized what she describes as “the largest girls’ 
initiation ceremony in the history of the Oio region” of the 
country.177 In fact, rather than retreat en masse from the practice, as 
envisaged by activists, there is evidence that even in communities 
which traditionally did not practice FGR, girls are voluntarily 
electing to be circumcised, in apparent imitation of their neighbors 
and defiance of what they perceive as unjustified meddling in their 
affairs by foreigners.178  There are several other instances of defiance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 Gutmann, supra note 40, at xxi.  
176 Carlos D. Londoño Sulkin, Anthropology, Liberalism and Female 
Genital Cutting, 25 ANTHROPOL. TODAY 17, 19 (2009); see also Nancy Scheper-
Hughes, Virgin Territory: The Male Discovery of the Clitoris, 5 MED. 
ANTHROPOL. Q. 25, 26 (1991). 
177 Michelle C. Johnson, Becoming a Muslim, Becoming a Person: 
Female “Circumcision,” Religious Identity, and Personhood in Guinea Bissau, in 
FEMALE “CIRCUMCISION” IN AFRICA: CULTURE, CONTROVERSY AND CHANGE 
215, 231 (Bettina Shell-Duncan & Ylva Hernlund eds., 2000).  
178  Lori Leonard, Adopting Female “Circumcision” in Southern Chad: 
The Experience of Myabé, in FEMALE “CIRCUMCISION” IN AFRICA: CULTURE, 
CONTROVERSY AND CHANGE 167, 184 (Bettina Shell-Duncan & Ylva 
Hernlund ed., 2000) (finding that although women in Myabé (Southeastern Chad) 
are volunteering to be circumcised, their culture does not require the procedure as a 
prerequisite for marriage and neither is there any evidence that men prefer 
circumcised women.).  
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against the ban of FGR.179 They bear no repeating here; but it 
suffices to add that widespread resistance to anti-FGR legislative 
frameworks is a natural consequence of the conflict between culture 
and law – a legal regime that came into existence without input from 
the primarily affected population.  This is an alien imposition, to say 
the least. Yet, as observed nearly three decades ago, “[f]or any law to 
grow and be productive, it must be rooted in the culture and tradition 
as well as the realities of the people for whom it is made.”180  In this 
conflict, the congenital defective nature of the law guarantees its 
failure to impact the population in the manner envisaged. 
 
V. Conclusion: toward a new human rights paradigm 
 
 Let us assume that the year was 1945, instead of 2013, with 
the vast majority of the States now averse to the legitimacy of 
homosexual rights and sexual/reproductive rights agenda still 
asphyxiating under colonial subjugation. France was able to persuade 
other Western powers at the negotiating table to approve a treaty 
institutionalizing these rights, to adopt some framework akin to the 
Yogyakarta Principles (in the case of homosexuality).181 The Holy 
See is subdued. Then fast forward to 2013. By this time, third world 
countries have been granted political independence, coincidentally 
by France and its allies. Traditional values hold sway in these newly 
independent nations. They are given a list of human rights they are to 
observe, rights which, they are informed, represent universal values. 
As proof of this universality, a treaty adopted by an international 
body, namely, the UN, recognizing these rights, is tendered. Their 
non-participation in the negotiations leading up to the adoption of the 
treaty, they are told, is immaterial. Their argument that some of the 
provisions of the treaty are inconsistent with their moral 
epistemology is equally muted. Stunned, they wonder amongst 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 Nnamuchi, Harm or Benefit?, supra note 167, at 256-57. 
180 G.O. Olusanya, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
History and Development, Paper Presented at the Seminar Marking the Centenary 
of Legal Profession in Nigeria, Lagos, Feb. 21, 1986, cited in Olusola Ojo, 
Understanding Human Rights in Africa, Paper Presented at the Preparatory 
Conference on Human Rights: Individual Rights or Collective Rights, University 
of Limburg, Maastricht, Netherlands, Sept. 18–20, 1987, 10. 
181 Yogyakarta Principles, supra note 134. 
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themselves about the moral authority of such treaty or the legitimacy 
of the rights they purportedly protect.182 In a sense, this is the 
concern or objection, even if not couched in these terms, which the 
2009 Russian-sponsored resolution (A/HRC/RES/12/21), which 
triggered the current process at the UNHRC, seeks to raise.183  
Homosexuality is used in this paper as a proxy for a larger 
issue, namely, how to negotiate and resolve clash of values 
underlying human rights. Homosexuality was chosen, amongst many 
other contentious right-based claims, not on account of any 
distinguishing peculiarity or characteristic, except that activists, by 
incessantly juxtaposing homosexual agenda against traditional 
values, made it an unavoidable analytical issue.  For this reason 
alone, it would have been intellectually impossible to do justice to 
the subject of this paper without considerable attention to claims 
associated with homosexual agenda. Moreover, homosexual rights 
advocates have been wildly successful in casting opposing voices as 
primordial brutes, intent on denying what they project as legitimate 
claims of human rights. By comparing homosexuals to slaves, for 
instance, this group seeks to push traditionalists into a corner of non-
redemption, as defenders of the indefensible. As morally outrageous 
as it is to deliberately confuse the current status of homosexuals with 
hundreds of years of systematic lynching, murder, rape, 
propertization and other dehumanizing treatment meted out to a 
select group of people simply as a result of their skin color, the 
message has gained formidable traction amongst a wide array of 
people, including, quite paradoxically, those whose forebears 
perished at the temple of slavery. These bogus claims need to be 
checked. Humanity gains nothing when novel claims are stamped 
with the imprimatur of rights based upon false assumptions and 
spuriously wild conjectures. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 Although not new, this question continues to dog human rights. 
Virginia E. Leary asks, rather rhetorically, given the “preponderant Western 
influence on the philosophy and language of the [UDHR], must we renounce its 
pretensions to universality?” See Virginia E. Leary, The Effect of Western 
Perspectives on International Human Rights, in  AN-NA'IM & DENG, supra note 
56, at 22.  
183 HRC Res. 12/21, supra note 4. 
 
 
 
 
75 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. Vol. XIV 
	  
	  
75	  
	  
There is a reason Dred Scott v. John FA Sandford, which held 
that African-Americans, whether free or slave, could never become 
citizens of the United States, remains, by far, the worst decision in 
the archives of the United States constitutional law.184 For the benefit 
of revisionist historians, we may do well to recall the imperial words 
of Chief Justice Taney: 
 
They [slaves] had for more than a century before been 
regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether 
unfit to associate with the white race, either in social 
or political relations; and so far inferior that they had 
no rights which the white man was bound to respect; 
and that the Negro might justly and lawfully be 
reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was bought and 
sold and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise 
and traffic whenever a profit could be made by it. 
This opinion was at that time fixed and universal in 
the civilized portion of the white race.185 
 
The key words are that slaves in America “had no rights which the 
white man,” or anyone else for that matter, was under obligation to 
respect. Can the same be said of homosexuals today? Has any 
scholar of note, or even a serious political figure, ever invoked 
culture or traditional value as a basis for commodifying gay men or 
lesbians?  
So, what is the purpose of this unwarranted comparison, the 
attempt to link homosexuality with slavery? The answer seems fairly 
obvious: to mute opposition (explaining unreflective ascription of 
homophobic, gay-bashing and intolerant impulses to those in the 
opposition).186 No one wishes to be seen as being in the same camp 
as slave owners. A spokesperson puts it this way: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 60 U.S. 393(1857). 
185 Id. at 407. 
186 A Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN) broadcast of July 5, 
2013 (7AM News Commentary) suggests boycotting of countries that have 
legalized same-sex marriage. This is a reflection of popular opinion in Nigeria but 
would, of course, be condemned in countries against which the FRCN commentary 
was directed. 
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There is no doubt that governments will continue to 
use traditional values as a way of justifying human 
rights abuses, particularly against the most marginal 
and vulnerable members of society. But it will be a 
sad day for the United Nations if human rights 
abusers are able to turn to a “traditional values” 
resolution to back up their spurious claims.187 
 
Elsewhere, this author opines: 
 
[I]n secular morality (as opposed to 
religious/Christian morality) or as a matter of human 
rights stricto sensu, even in absence of legislative or 
judicial [authority], the right to follow one’s sexual 
preferences cannot be abridged unless 
operationalizing the right detrimentally impacts the 
right of another person.188   
 
But postulating that the right is claimable does not mean that those 
who believe that such operationalization would be deleterious upon 
their own rights should not be able to put forth their objections. 
Demanding that human rights be subjected to considerations rooted 
in the tradition and culture of various societies that comprise the 
global community, as espoused by the resolution that set the current 
process at the UNHRC in motion, is not the same as a concerted 
effort by concerned nations to stymie human rights. To the contrary, 
it is the human right to voice opposition to the “attack on traditional 
values” that is in danger.189 
 Consider this illustration. In a move described as a “truly 
shocking extra-constitutional power grab” and a “defection of duty,” 
President Barrack Obama, in 2011, ordered his Attorney General not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 Reid, supra note 116. 
188 Nnamuchi, Hands Off My Pudendum, supra note 113, at 283. 
189 Bret Hayworth, Bishop: Gay Ruling an Attack on Traditional Values, 
SIOUX CITY JOURNAL.COM, April 3, 2009, available at 
http://siouxcityjournal.com/blogs/politically_speaking/bishop-gay-ruling-an-
attack-on-traditional-values/article_e93a5c32-8a3b-5ad0-930f-227d399f79eb.html. 
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to defend the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),190 which defines 
marriage as excluding same-sex union. His action, grounded in the 
belief that the statute is unconstitutional, effectively silenced the 
voice of millions of traditional value-oriented Americans who were 
represented by Congress, which passed the statute.191 Shocking or 
not, the President has been chided by some and lauded by others, 
which adds nothing really new to the debate. But, more to the point, 
Obama’s action reflects his own ideological-driven left-leaning value 
system, his personal conviction and moral epistemology, which, on 
all grounds, considers DOMA offensive. And this too was 
manifested in United States v. Edith Windsor, a case that challenged 
the constitutionality of §3 of DOMA.192  
 Obviously, for legal scholars, the critical point of the 
decision, handed down on June 26, 2013, is the abrogation of §3 of 
DOMA as unconstitutional; but the decision is significant in another 
important respect. A sharply divided court speaks to different 
conceptualizations of human rights, informed by individual beliefs or 
value systems of the justices of the highest court in the land.193 The 
history of DOMA, a widely popular legislation supported by 85 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), Pub.L. 104–199, 
 110 Stat. 2419, codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. 
191 Jan Crawford, Obama Administration Decision to not Defend Defense 
of Marriage Act will Trigger Heated Political Battle, CBS  NEWS, Feb. 23, 2011, 
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504564_162-20035495-504564.html. 
192 United States v. Windsor, 570 U. S. ____ (2013) (Slip Op. 12-307). 
Section §3 of DOMA provides as follows:  
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any 
ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative 
bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word ‘marriage’ 
means only a legal union between one man and one woman as 
husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person 
of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.  
1 U. S. C. §7. 
193  All the five liberal justices, two of whom were appointed by Obama, 
voted to strike down the traditional family value-oriented statute (Sonia 
Sotomayor, Stephen G. Breyer, Elena Kagan, Anthony Kennedy and Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg) in contrast to the four conservatives on the Court (Chief Justice John 
Roberts, Samuel A. Alito, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas ) that filed  a 
scathing dissent to the majority opinion. 
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senators and 342 representatives,194 is quite revealing as to what the 
statue expresses: “moral disapproval of homosexuality, and a moral 
conviction that heterosexuality better comports with traditional 
(especially Judeo-Christian) morality.” 195 But the gentlemen in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. ____ (2013) (Slip Op. 12-
307)(Roberts, C.J. dissenting). 
195 H. R. Rep. No.104–664, at 16 (1996). Evidently, the plaintiff and the 
majority of the Justices of the United States Supreme Court think of morality in 
starkly different terms, a point underscored in Justice Scalia’s dissent. Following a 
thorough chastisement of the majority for embarking upon what he equates to 
chasing a constitutional shadow, Justice Scalia zeroes in on a key finding that he 
argues would have justified the majority opinion – a finding “that same-sex 
marriage is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” See United States 
v. Windsor, 570 U.S. ____ (2013) (Slip Op. 12-307)(Scalia J., dissenting). Yet, the 
majority made no such finding. They could not, regardless of their best efforts. 
Equating the majority ruling to a declaration of “open season on any law that (in 
the opinion of the law’s opponents and any panel of like-minded federal judges) 
can be characterized as mean-spirited,” the Justice expresses alarm at the 
conclusion of the majority “that the only motive for [DOMA] was the “bare . . . 
desire to harm a politically unpopular group,” and its claim that DOMA’s 
supporters “acted with malice—with the ‘purpose’ . . . ‘to disparage and to injure’ 
same-sex couples . . . to ‘demean’ . . . to ‘impose inequality,’ . . . to ‘impose . . . a 
stigma’ . . . to deny people ‘equal dignity’. . . to brand gay people as ‘unworthy,’. . 
.  and to ‘humiliat[e]’ their children.” Id. at 19. That liberal Justices in the court 
would unflinchingly throw judicial temperament (restraint in choice of language) 
to the wind, in castigating the United States Congress and the Presidency in these 
vile terms, speaks to the vitriolic nature of the debate surrounding the place of 
homosexuality, same-sex marriage and other atypical lifestyles in contemporary 
world. Justice Scalia describes the action as demeaning to the judicial branch. Id. at 
21. He continues: 
 
Laying such a charge against them [Congress and Presidency] 
should require the most extraordinary evidence, and I would 
have thought that every attempt would be made to indulge a 
more anodyne explanation for the statute. The majority does the 
opposite—affirmatively concealing from the reader the 
arguments that exist in justification. It makes only a passing 
mention of the “arguments put forward” by the Act’s [DOMA’s] 
defenders, and does not even trouble to paraphrase or describe 
them. . . I imagine that this is because it is harder to maintain the 
illusion of the Act’s supporters as unhinged members of a wild-
eyed lynch mob when one first describes their views as they see 
them Id. at 19. 
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black robes (at least the majority) know better, or so they think, 
explaining why Windsor, much like the major powers at the UN, has 
succeeded in opening a new frontier of controversy in traditional 
values and, what some might call, “new-age” human rights. At stake 
is the precise limit or boundary of human rights, the process that 
would determine them, and who ultimately determines them. 
  This author believes that there is an important place for 
traditional values in future development of human rights, not just the 
culture of a select few countries but from all parts and corners of the 
globe. This should not be interpreted to imply advocacy for 
indiscriminate embrace of all traditional values; rather, every nation 
should be allowed to project its values and let the propriety or 
legitimacy of each claim as worthy of anchoring human rights be 
debated in an open forum. This has been termed a “cross-cultural 
fertilization of ideas.”196 As evident from the discussion in the 
preceding sections, human rights – both in theory and practice – 
reflect quite strongly the worldviews of a particular segment of the 
human population. Yet, for the ascription of universality, which 
human rights depend upon for their legitimacy, worldviews from 
non-Western nations need not be brushed aside. This has been the 
main argument of this paper. 
There is no question that non-compatibility of prescriptions 
of human rights with traditional values of many societies is at the 
root of claims of violations of these same rights by authorities 
charged with protecting them. Cobbah was quite on point: what is 
counted today as human rights violation in Africa is, in reality, the 
unavoidable consequence of supplanting African communal lifestyle 
with Western liberalism. “In other words,” he posits, “we may be 
seeing these abuses” precisely “because we are attempting too hard 
to make Westerners out of Africans.”197  To put it differently, 
because the standards against which these countries are judged have 
nothing to do with their value system or moral ontology, it is the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Even as stunned supporters of DOMA weigh the impact of this decision, think 
tanks are already busy, strategizing on a reversal of the decision. The status of 
traditional values, once cherished throughout the land, faces an uncertain future in 
the United States as in several other countries. 
196 Cobbah, supra note 105, at 310. 
197 Id. 
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imposition, bereft at its core of the people’s cultural experiences, 
which is the culprit.198 Human rights scholar Abdullahi An-Na'im 
seems to validate this point in arguing that the “difficulties in 
implementing established human rights effectively, and in 
recognizing other claims and interests as human rights and 
implementing them also, derive from insufficiency of cultural 
support for the particular right or claim.”199 Conscious that 
recognition of a particular claim as a human right in a formal 
instrument, regardless of its nature, imbues no cultural legitimacy to 
the claim, An-Na'im notes that the “process through which the 
current international human rights standards were formulated and 
adopted did not address issues of cultural legitimacy in relation to 
most of the cultural traditions of the world.”200 
The importance of these concerns derives from the reality 
that the goal of human rights law is to elicit behavior change or 
modification from individuals as well as authorities in a manner that 
leads to the realization of the good of all. Unless this goal is 
actualized, all efforts at national, regional or international levels in 
the human rights field amount to naught. An illustration was given 
earlier with the current global effort at criminalization of FGR. As 
previously explained, although ostensibly packaged as completely 
grounded in protecting the human rights of women in affected 
countries, the effort has had negligible impact. The reason is not far-
fetched: prohibition is simply contrary to the ways of life of the 
target population, creating an irreconcilable conflict between 
functioning normative standards and alien imposition. Thus, because 
FGR is perceived as a prescription of culture and religion, an 
ineliminable part of the people’s identity, efforts at compelling 
abandonment have fallen by the wayside.201 A recent paper puts it 
this way: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 See Olusanya, supra note 180; see also Schwartz, supra note 57, at 369 
(arguing that it its futile to attempt to force change in human conduct through the 
instrumentality of law that is alien to the cultural norms of the people).   
199 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Problems of Universal Cultural 
Legitimacy for Human Rights, in AN-NA'IM & DENG, supra note 56, at 331, 333. 
200 Id. 
201 Lynn Thomas,“Ngaitana (I Will Circumcise Myself)”: Lessons from 
Colonial Campaigns to Ban Excision in Meru, Kenya, in FEMALE CIRCUMCISION 
IN AFRICA, supra note 177, at 129 (explaining how, in defiance of a 1956 law 
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 “[b]ecause such laws are not home-grown (but 
rather sponsored by, and packaged under the 
auspices of, foreign organizations or governments) 
and, perhaps most damaging, sharply conflict with 
the ideals and expectations of the people whose 
conducts are targeted, most [of these] legislative 
frameworks suffer congenital defect from which they 
never recover.202 
 
This is the fate of legal regimes, human rights-oriented or not, 
that came into being without sufficient consideration of the cultural 
sensibilities of the people concerned. As recent experiences clearly 
highlight, co-opting important cultural or religions figures in the 
community into the scheme, are no game-changers. In Iraqi 
Kurdistan, FGR remains prevalent, despite the promulgation of a 
prohibitory statute in August 2011, and subsequent issuance of 
fatwa, under the hand of 33 imams and scholars in that region, 
denouncing FGR as non-Islamic.203 These efforts are congenitally 
defective because by seeking to undermine the community’s 
sociopolitical and economic equilibrium, particularly by forcibly 
negating extant moral standards, they rob themselves of the most 
decisive element needed for compliance: cultural legitimacy.204 The 
reality is that lack of “concern for human rights as they figure in the 
standards of many different cultures” (which produces laws that are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
which outlawed clitoridectomy in Meru (Kenya), a large contingent of adolescent 
girls in the community decided to circumcise themselves notwithstanding the risk 
of punishment); see also Michelle C. Johnson, Becoming a Muslim, Becoming a 
Person: Female “Circumcision,” Religious Identity, and Personhood in Guinea 
Bissau, in FEMALE CIRCUMCISION IN AFRICA, supra note 177,  at 231 (reporting 
that in response to a threat to ban FGR in Guinea Bissau, women in the town of 
Mansoa organized what she describes as “the largest girls’ initiation ceremony in 
the history of the Oio region”). 
202 Nnamuchi, Harm or Benefit?, supra note 167, at n.256.  
203 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2013: EVENTS OF 2012, 
24 (2013). 
204 For a comprehensive account of the interface between cultural 
legitimacy and human rights, see AN-NA'IM & DENG, supra note 56, at 331 – 67. 
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not culturally legitimate) is at the root of the wide discrepancy 
between human rights theory and practice.205  
There is often a temptation (and this must be resisted) to rely 
on isolated instances as evidence that such frameworks have the 
desired effect on the targeted conduct. But even if such claims can be 
substantiated, that really does not say anything about the legitimacy 
of such laws. The relevant question is whether “individuals merely 
comply to the imperatives of their situation or whether they conform, 
having internalized the values and behavioral requisites of the 
prevailing order.”206 In any event, compliance by individuals, “while 
believing that their human rights or their sense of dignity is being,” 
eroded, is not unheard of.207  Many decrees in a military dictatorship, 
for instance, fall within this genre of laws. Despite all these odd 
cases, the norm is that a legal regime, which is culturally illegitimate 
(in the sense of being inconsistent with prevailing mores), much like 
an unjust law, lacks moral authority to compel compliance, the 
reason for the inevitable fatality of such regimes.208 This has been the 
position of people questioning the universality credentials of 
international human rights law including the sponsors of the on-
going process at the UNHRC:  
 
The “international bill of human rights” is hailed as 
reflecting a world-wide consensus on the nature and 
substance of human rights. It is a deceptively false 
consensus. Ratification of the various covenants and 
conventions, frequently with exceptions, is an 
assertion of membership in the world community and 
not a commitment to the implementation of these 
rights or to their legitimacy. . . The absence of a 
genuine consensus on human rights necessitates 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 Id. at 332.  
206 TOWARD A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK, supra note 52, at 23 
(describing Nicholas P. Pollis’ conformity compliance index); Nicholas P. Pollis, 
Conformity, Compliance and Human Rights 3 HUM. RTS. Q. 93-105 (1981). 
207 Id. 
208 AN-NA'IM & DENG, supra note 56, at 333 (arguing that the challenges 
faced in implementing established human rights are the result of “insufficiency of 
cultural support for the particular right or claim.”). 
 
 
 
 
83 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. Vol. XIV 
	  
	  
83	  
	  
rethinking and a search for new foundations for the 
construction of a reconstituted human rights theory.209 
 
Even if in truth, as the final report of the Advisory Committee of the 
UNHRC seemingly suggests, “multiplicity of origin of human rights 
could be detected in reading the articles of the [UDHR],” this fact 
does not end the inquiry.210  Multiple origins, without more, does not 
confer legitimacy. At any rate, the word “multiplicity” does not mean 
the same thing as “universality.” Thus, although countries that were 
represented at the negotiations leading up to the adoption of the 
UDHR in 1948 might be tempted to make such connection, their 
views do not reflect the position of a legion of other countries that 
had no representation at the negotiation table.  This explains the 
dissenting voices of scholars such as Legesse, Cobbah and others 
examined above. The question then becomes, does the final report 
sufficiently address the concern of these scholars, the concern that 
underscored the process that triggered the advisory opinion? Hardly. 
On the key question, regarding the relationship between human 
rights and traditional values, the report may be summed up as saying 
that traditional values that are consistent with the goal of protecting 
and promoting human rights (which the Committee describes as 
positive) should be reinforced and negative ones discarded.211 This 
conclusion raises more questions than answers. Who determines 
which values are positive or negative? According to what 
parameters? How is the UDHR an acceptable standard against which 
to assess traditional values when many countries never voted in 
support of the regime?  
Aside from these concerns, there are more specific practical 
problems. Again, we use homosexuality as an illustration. How does 
the conclusion of the Advisory Committee address the controversy 
surrounding gay “rights” such as same-sex marriage, which is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209 Adamantia Polis & Peter Schwab, Introduction, in ADAMANTIA POLIS 
& PETER SCHWAB HUMAN RIGHTS: NEW PERSPECTIVES, NEW REALITIES 1, 15 
(2000). 
210 UNHRC, Study of the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee on 
Promoting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms through a Better 
Understanding of Traditional Values of Humankind, ¶ 33, 22nd Sess.,, 
A/HRC/22/71 (Dec. 6, 2012). 
211 Id. at ¶¶ 46, 80. 
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generally opposed in non-Western societies, including Russia, but 
approved in many countries in the West? What do you say to people 
in traditional societies, for instance those embracing Judeo-Christian 
morality, which regards homosexual coitus as an abomination? How 
does one define a family?  Is it consistent with human rights to 
define family as Olga Batalina, the deputy head of the Committee on 
Family, Women and Children at the Russian Parliament, does: “a 
family is a marriage between a man and a woman with children, 
preferably at least three”? 212 Batalina’s definition is, of course, 
rooted in the Russian Orthodox Church, to which President Vladimir 
Putin is said to be increasingly turning and “integrating its rhetoric of 
traditional values” into governance of the country.213 But, then, an 
irresistibly astute follow-up question would relate to how this 
definition squares up with the Windsor case previously examined or 
the general attitude toward homosexuals in the West?  
Insight is provided by the reaction to a recently adopted 
legislation in Russia prohibiting the spread of propaganda of 
"nontraditional sexual relations" amongst minors.214 The law defines 
homosexual propaganda as anything “aimed at the formation of 
nontraditional sexual behavior” and imposes stiff penalty upon 
violators, up to $150 on individuals and up to $30,000 for 
companies, including media organizations.215 Associated Press 
reports that “[w]hile the law provoked a backlash in the West, where 
protesters called for a boycott of Russian vodka in gay bars across 
North America, it has stirred little contention in Russia.”216 A poll 
conducted in May by the independent Levada's Center found that an 
overwhelming majority of Russians, 78 percent, consider 
homosexuality either “licentiousness” or “a sickness or result of 
some psychological trauma.”217 This is a far cry from the perception 
of homosexuality in Western countries. Translation, a wide gulf 
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Conservative Cause, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug.  9, 2013), available at 
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exists between both worlds; and, as yet, there is no indication that 
even with the best effort of the Advisory Committee of the UNHRC, 
the gap has been or would be bridged any time soon. So, what to do? 
We must go back to the drawing board. Bridging this increasingly 
expanding world of differences must persist along the line of 
“constant dialogue between different countries and peoples”218 on 
which values should or should not form the foundation of human 
rights.  In the end, the undeniable truth remains that so long as we are 
talking about values that will guide all mankind, an indispensable 
feature of “any system of ideas that claims to be universalistic” is 
that it “must contain critical elements in its fabric that are avowedly 
of African, Latin American or Asian derivative.”219 Any suggestion 
to the contrary seems grossly untenable. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 UNHRC, supra note 210,  ¶ 80. 
219 Legesse, supra note 54, at 123; see also Toope, supra note 156, at 184 
(advising that “[i]f we are to succeed in bridging the so-called clash of cultures, it 
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